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CYBER! 
Andrea M. Matwyshyn∗ 
This Article challenges the basic assumptions of the emerging legal 
area of “cyber” or “cybersecurity.” It argues that the two dominant 
“cybersecurity” paradigms—information sharing and deterrence—fail 
to recognize that corporate information security and national 
“cybersecurity” concerns are inextricable. This problem of “reciprocal 
security vulnerability” means that in practice our current legal 
paradigms channel us in suboptimal directions. Drawing insights from 
the work of philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, this Article identifies 
three flaws that pervade the academic and policy analysis of security, 
exacerbating the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability—privacy 
conflation, incommensurability, and internet exceptionalism. It then 
offers a new paradigm—reciprocal security. Reciprocal security reframes 
information security law and policy as part of broader security policy, 
focusing on two key elements: security vigilance infrastructure and 
defense primacy. The Article concludes by briefly introducing five sets of 
concrete legal and policy proposals embodying the new reciprocal 
security  paradigm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I have a really bad feeling about this. 
—Han Solo (as Ewoks prepare to cook him)1 
 
Once upon a time, in a galaxy not far away,2 there lived the citizens 
of the Republic of Gadgetopia. For many years, a golden age of 
technological prosperity reigned over the land—an age of the beauty 
and the baud.3 Gadgetopia’s gadgets became progressively more 
magical4 and interconnected, even talking to each other through a 
global network that almost seamlessly connected citizens with each 
other and their government. But, as Gadgetopia’s citizens reveled in 
their shiny new world and began to rely on connected gadgets in their 
daily lives, they failed to notice that their social structures were 
straining under the weight of these new technologies. 
Then, one day, a darker age arrived—an age of the bug and the 
brick.5 Gadgetopia’s magical technologies began to cause harm, 
malfunctioning because of coding errors and human failures of care. 
Criminals began to steal information that citizens shared freely 
through their devices and began to demand ransom.6 Government 
agencies began to lose control of their national security secrets.7 
 
 1.  STAR WARS: EPISODE VI – RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983).  
 2.  See generally STAR WARS: EPISODE IV – A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977) (“A long 
time ago, in a galaxy far, far away . . . .”). 
 3.  See generally The Mentor, The Conscience of a Hacker, PHRACK MAGAZINE, Sept. 25, 
1986, http://phrack.org/issues/7/3.html (“This is our world now. . . the world of the electron 
and the switch, the beauty of the baud.”). 
 4.  Arthur C. Clarke famously asserted in what is known as Clarke’s third law that “[a]ny 
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” See Esther Inglis-Arkell, 
Technology Isn’t Magic: Why Clarke’s Third Law Always Bugged Me, IO9 (Apr. 28, 2013, 11:00 
AM), http://io9.gizmodo.com/technology-isnt-magic-why-clarkes-third-law-always-bug-
479194151 (“Arthur C Clarke was a brilliant futurist and writer, but he is probably most widely 
known for the third of his famous three laws, ‘Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic.’”). 
 5.  A bricked device is one that has become nonfunctional, meaning that it has basically 
become an expensive brick. See Chris Hoffman, What Does “Bricking” a Device Mean?, HOW-
TO GEEK (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.howtogeek.com/126665/htg-explains-what-does-
bricking-a-device-mean/ (“‘Bricking’ essentially means a device has turned into a brick.”). 
 6.  For a discussion of recent ransomware attacks, see, e.g., Brian Heater, The Growing 
Threat of Ransomware, PC (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/news/343 
547/the-growing-threat-of-ransomware. 
 7.  For a discussion of technology compromise of national security secrets, see, for 
example, Mohit Kumar, After Failed Auction, Shadow Brokers Opens NSA Hacking Tools for 
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Gadgetopia’s stock markets8 and elections9 began to demonstrate 
technological irregularities. Cars began to kill people because of 
coding errors in brakes10 and engines11 that car manufacturers had 
missed or chosen not to fix.12 Medical devices and hospital machines 
began to harm patients due to code “glitches” in ways that were 
impossible for average citizens to monitor and avoid.13 Imprudently-
connected infrastructure,14 power grids,15 and public safety systems16 
began to fail, and Gadgetopia’s enemies began to attack it remotely 
through the very same technologies that had previously brought social 
prosperity.17 Eventually, Gadgetopia’s citizens stopped trusting their 
 
Direct Sales, THE HACKER NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://thehackernews.com/2016/12/nsa-
hack-shadow-brokers.html. 
 8.  For a discussion of security vulnerabilities in stock markets, see, for example, Priya 
Anand, How Vulnerable Are the U.S. Stock Markets to Hackers?, MARKETWATCH (July 31, 2015, 
11:17 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-vulnerable-are-the-us-stock-markets-
to-hackers-2015-07-31. 
 9.  For a discussion of election system vulnerabilities, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY AND RELIABILITY RISKS (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org
/sites/default/files/analysis/Fact_Sheet_Voting_System_Security.pdf. 
 10.  For a discussion of one vulnerable vehicle, see Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely 
Kill a Jeep on the Highway – With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.wir 
ed.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/ (“Their code is an automaker’s night-
mare: software that lets hackers send commands through the Jeep’s entertainment system to its 
dashboard functions, steering, brakes, and transmission, all from a laptop that may be across 
the country.”). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See, e.g., Anne Marie Porrello, Death and Denial: The Failure of the THERAC-25, 
A Medical Linear Accelerator (unpublished Computer Science paper, California Polytechnic 
State University), http://users.csc.calpoly.edu/~jdalbey/SWE/Papers/THERAC25.html 
(chronicling death or severe radiation injury to patients due to software malfunction in the 
Therac-25 machine). 
 14.  See, e.g., Erik Larson, Patricia Hurtado & Chris Strohm, Iranians Hacked from Wall 
Street to New York Dam, U.S. Says, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:20 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-24/u-s-charges-iranian-hackers-in-wall-street-
cyberattacks-im6b43tt. 
 15.  See, e.g., Jamie Condliffe, Ukraine’s Power Grid Gets Hacked Again, a Worrying Sign 
for Infrastructure Attacks, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.technology 
review.com/s/603262/ukraines-power-grid-gets-hacked-again-a-worrying-sign-for-infrastruct 
ure-attacks/. 
 16.  See, e.g., Kristen Lee, It’s Scarily Easy to Hack a Traffic Light, JALOPNIK (Aug. 16, 
2016, 8:50 AM), http://jalopnik.com/its-scarily-easy-to-hack-a-traffic-light-1785313010. 
 17.  See, e.g., PAUL RUGGIERO & JON FOOTE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBER 
THREATS TO MOBILE PHONES (2011), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publicat 
ions/cyber_threats-to_mobile_phones.pdf. 
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gadgets, their markets, and their government, and the economy 
faltered. Things ended badly in Gadgetopia. 
Gadgetopia may strike you as a scary place to live. Sadly, however, 
the story of Gadgetopia is a dystopic but entirely plausible version of 
the United States’ future. We have entered our age of the bug and the 
brick. Whether our story ends more happily than Gadgetopia’s is now 
up to us. This Article attempts to offer a concrete legal path away from 
Gadgetopia’s fate and toward meaningful security. Despite 105 
“cybersecurity” bills introduced in Congress in 201518 and the 
successful passage of federal information sharing legislation, the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2015,19 the “emerging national crisis”20 in both 
public and private sector information security continues to escalate 
unabated. Why? 
Perhaps we are missing the bigger picture. This Article offers that 
bigger picture and a radically different paradigm for information 
security regulation. Two ill-suited regulatory models from the last 
century currently dominate the legal and policy discussions 
of  “cybersecurity” law and policy—information sharing21 
and  deterrence.22 This Article does not attempt to “cyberize” last 
century’s  regulatory paradigms for “the cyberspace domain.”23 
Instead, this  Article highlights the underappreciated reality that 
corporate information security and national “cybersecurity” are 
reciprocal and inextricably interwoven. Consequently, it advocates a 
 
 18.  See, e.g., David J. Bender, Congress Passes the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-cybersecurity-act-
2015; Nick Leiserson & Jen Ellis, Political Pwnage: The Hacker’s Guide to Cybersecurity Policy, 
Address at ShmooCon Hacker Convention (Jan. 2016), https://archive.org/details/Political 
_Pwnage_The_Hackers_Guide_to_Cybersecurity. 
 19. Bender, supra note 18. 
 20.  For testimony of Professor Matt Blaze at Congressional hearing, see Patrick Howell 
O’Neill, FBI Slammed on Capitol Hill for ‘Stupid’ Ideas About Encryption, DAILY DOT (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/second-crypto-war-hearing-washington/. 
 21.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 22.  “I think clearly the concepts of deterrence in the cyber domain are still relatively 
immature. We clearly are not I think where we need to be. . . . This is still the early stages of 
cyber in many ways.” Interview by Jim Sciutto with Mike Rogers, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency, https: 
//www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=32&v=EDZSoCCZU_s (statements at 4:00). 
 23.  The “cyber domain” or “cyberspace domain” is a term used by military officials to 
refer to internet-enabled information transfers. It is predicated on the notion that the internet is 
a separate “battlefield,” divorced from kinetic space. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-38: CYBER 
ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES 1-5, (2014), http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf. 
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different legal approach—a decentralized, technically-robust 
regulatory paradigm called “reciprocal security.” 
Part II introduces the problem of “reciprocal security 
vulnerability”—the practical reality that the information security of 
the private and public sector are inextricably interwoven. It also 
introduces the emerging legal field that is often called—for better or 
worse24—“cyber” or “cybersecurity law” and challenges the field’s two 
dominant regulatory models, information sharing and deterrence. 
Commenting on the analytical shortcomings of current 
“cybersecurity” legal scholarship, Part II then dissects three analytical 
flaws plaguing this “cyberized” legal scholarship and policy on 
security: privacy conflation, incommensurability, and internet 
exceptionalism. Next, using the security-related provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a security case study, 
Part II explains how these three flaws have led to unnecessarily 
adversarial and confused “cybersecurity” rhetoric in both the public 
and private sector. In fact, current rhetoric is so muddled that it 
threatens to pit different federal agencies’ missions squarely 
against  each other, simultaneously damaging both innovation and 
national  security. 
With the goal of addressing the flaws identified in Part II, Part III 
introduces the work of seminal philosopher of science Michael Polanyi 
and highlights his insights on comprehending complicated, 
“polycentric”25 problems through harnessing “tacit knowledge” with 
“subsidiary awareness.”26 Borrowing lessons from Polanyi’s work, Part 
III next uses the cognitive exercise of the Monty Hall problem to 
advocate reframing legal and policy efforts through introducing an 
attacker mindset. Finally, Part III applies a healthy dose of what First 
Amendment scholars have called “epistemological humility.”27 Part IV 
then introduces a new paradigm known as reciprocal security. 
Reciprocal security is an innovation-sensitive approach to jointly 
improve both public and private sector security. Two concrete goals 
animate the reciprocal security paradigm: creation of a security 
 
 24.  See infra Section II.B. 
 25.  See infra Section III.A.1. 
 26.  See infra text accompanying notes 394–97. 
 27.  See discussion infra Section III.C. 
3.MATWYSHYN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018 10:45 AM 
1109 CYBER! 
 1115 
vigilance infrastructure and defense primacy.28 Part IV then briefly 
introduces five specific light-touch legal and policy proposals 
embodying the reciprocal security paradigm. These proposals will 
be  explored in greater depth in a subsequent companion essay.29 
Part  V  concludes. 
II. CYBER ALL THE THINGS:30  
WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG?31 
The world is a dangerous place, Elliott, not because of 
those who do evil, but because of those who look on and 
do  nothing. 
—Mr. Robot32 
 
The stakes of our national information security debate could not 
be higher. In December 2016, the White House issued a statement 
about the ejection of a group of Russian diplomats and levied 
sanctions against Russia,33 stating that these diplomatic measures arose 
as a consequence of Russia’s “significant malicious cyber-enabled 
activities”34 that “were intended to influence the election, erode faith 
in US democratic institutions, sow doubt about the integrity of our 
electoral process, and undermine confidence in the institutions of the 
US government.”35 Accompanied by a report from the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security,36 the announcement of sanctions 
 
 28.  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 29.  Andrea Matwyshyn, Cyber Harder (Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 30.  All the Things, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/all-the-
things (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 31.  What Could Possibly Go Wrong, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/ 
photos/732258 (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 32.  Mr. Robot: Ones and Zeroes (USA television broadcast Jul. 1, 2015).  
 33.  Evan Perez & Daniella Diaz, White House Announces Retaliation Against Russia: 
Sanctions, Ejecting Diplomats, CNN (Jan. 2, 2017, 10:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/12/29/politics/russia-sanctions-announced-by-white-house/index.html.  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Sam Thielman, FBI and Homeland Security Detail Russian Hacking Campaign in 
New Report, GUARDIAN, (Dec. 29, 2016, 5:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/tech 
nology/2016/dec/29/fbi-dhs-russian-hacking-report. 
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followed earlier reports of a CIA assessment that concluded “Russia 
intervened in the 2016 election.”37 But where do we go from here? 
Two regulatory paradigms from last century have dominated our 
national information security debate—information sharing and 
deterrence—and, yet, they are both imperfectly suited for the task. 
Both paradigms fail to address an underlying problem in security: the 
problem of reciprocal security vulnerability across the public and 
private sector. Similarly, current legal scholarship on “cybersecurity” 
also falls short, suffering from three prevalent analytical flaws: privacy 
conflation, incommensurability, and internet exceptionalism. 
A. Cybers, Cybers Everywhere:38 New Policy, Same as the Old Policy 
There’s a zero percent chance of this working. 
—Agent Lacy, The Interview39 
 
Security engineers sometimes colorfully refer to the unfortunate 
condition of “rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic”—the situation 
in which a looming and obvious problem is “addressed” by moving 
around existing (ineffectual) pieces until disaster inevitably strikes.40 
In “cybersecurity” law and policy, the “deck chairs” are the various 
sector-specific41 paradigms42 that comprise our current regulatory 
 
 37.  Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia 
Was Trying to Help Trump Win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.w 
ashingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-orders-review-of-russian-hacking-during-
presidential-campaign/2016/12/09/31d6b300-be2a-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html? 
utm_term=.4b50dc226882. 
 38.  X, X Everywhere, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/x-x-
everywhere (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 39.  THE INTERVIEW (Point Grey Pictures 2014). 
 40.  Doyle Rice, Titanic Deck Chairs’ Sad Symbolism Lives On, USA TODAY, http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-07/titanic-rearrange-deck-chairs/54 
084648/1 (last updated Apr. 7, 2012, 10:35 AM). 
 41. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2017). For HIPAA security rule, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
162, 164 (2017). For GLBA security rules, see 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2017).  
 42.  A common information sharing approach is the creation of sector-specific affinity 
groups—information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs). See, e.g., AUTO-ISAC, https:// 
wwwautomotiveisac.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); FIN. SERVICES: INFO. SHARING & 
ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.fsisac.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); R-CISC, https://r-
cisc.org/isac/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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approach.43 This segmented approach may seem superficially intuitive 
in light of traditional legal regulatory approaches and the practical 
realities of governmental inter-agency politics. It might seem 
expedient to treat various public and private sector security deficits as 
discrete and disconnected failures and to simply replace organizational 
management after each large compromise.44 This approach, however, 
falls victim to the condition of rearranging deck chairs described 
above: we risk losing sight of the bigger picture as we tinker with small 
pieces of it. 
Two recent large-scale security compromises—those of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment and the Office of Personnel Management—
demonstrate that the problems of security vulnerability are never 
isolated and discrete. Instead, they plague both the private 
and  public  sector reciprocally.45 In December 2014, Sony 
Pictures  Entertainment, Inc.,46 suffered a significant and far-reaching 
information security compromise,47 allegedly in retaliation for the 
planned release of the movie, The Interview.48 Because of Sony’s 
 
 43.  For a discussion of the sector-specific approach to security, see Andrea M. 
Matwyshyn, Data Devolution: Corporate Information Security, Consumers, and the Future of 
Regulation, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 713 (2010) (explaining dominant, sector-specific federal 
information security laws). 
 44.  We might also be inclined toward an endless cycle of simply naming, shaming, and 
replacing organizational leadership for security failures. See, e.g., Evan Perez & Wesley Bruer, 
OPM Director Katherine Archuleta Steps Down, CNN, (July 11, 2015, 10:06 AM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2015/07/10/politics/opm-director-resigns-katherine-archuleta/. 
 45.  For example, Professor Kristin Eichensehr argues that the United States operates 
under a “de facto system of ‘public-private cybersecurity’ . . . characterized by the surprisingly 
important, quasi-governmental role of the private sector on many important cybersecurity issues, 
and correspondingly, by instances in which the federal government acts more like a market 
participant than a traditional regulator.” See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 470–71 (2017). 
 46.  Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don’t Know So Far, WIRED 
(Dec. 3, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know. 
 47.  Aly Weisman, A Timeline of the Crazy Events in the Sony Hacking Scandal, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sony-cyber-hack-timeline-
2014-12. 
 48.  Id. 
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infamously checkered history49 of security management,50 information 
security experts immediately asked to what extent Sony’s public 
relations nightmare51 resulted from the company’s own failure to 
implement reasonable security.52 Meanwhile, despite some forensic 
data possibly to the contrary,53 the FBI and other government sources 
surprised the security community with a public announcement that 
the attack was orchestrated by a nation-state actor—North Korea.54 
But perhaps more troubling than the potentially hasty55 attribution56 
 
 49.  Sony was the subject of an FTC consent decree and several state attorney general 
investigations due to its use of code that resembled a rootkit—a security-compromising code 
tool used by malicious attackers—in its consumer products. This security invasive code was found 
in both government and corporate systems, placing them at risk for compromise. For a discussion 
of the Sony DRM rootkit, see Nate Anderson, FTC Finally Settles with Sony BMG Over Rootkit, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 30, 2007, 4:34 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2007/01/ 
8738/. For a legal discussion of the problematic nature of security-invasive DRM such as that 
used by Sony, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529 (2007). 
 50.  For example, Sony’s PlayStation network was down for an extended period of time 
due to a previous security compromise. See Samuel Gibbs, Sony Offers Discounts After Christmas 
PlayStation Network Hack, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2015, 6:06 AM), http://www.theguardian.c 
om/technology/2015/jan/02/sony-christmas-playstation-network-hack-discounts-psn-lizard 
-squad; Laura Northrup, PlayStation Network Users Report Hacked Accounts, Terrible Options 
from Sony, CONSUMERIST (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:59 PM), http://consumerist.com/2015/03/12 
/playstation-network-users-report-hacked-accounts-terrible-options-from-sony/; Jose Pagliery, 
Why Should We Trust the Sony PlayStation Network Ever Again?, CNN (Feb. 2, 2015, 12:47 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/02/technology/security/sony-playstation-hack/. 
 51.  See Dave Lewis, Sony Pictures Data Breach and the PR Nightmare, FORBES (Dec. 16, 
2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2014/12/16/sony-pictures-data-
breach-and-the-pr-nightmare. 
 52.  Infosec professionals highlight Sony’s history of “ongoing problems” of suboptimal 
security. See Security Curmudgeon, Absolute Sownage: A Concise History of Recent Sony Hacks, 
ATTRITION.ORG (June 4, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://attrition.org/security/rants/sony_aka_sow 
nage.html. 
 53.  Skeptical security experts pointed to alternate theories of the attack based on known 
facts, including the possibility of an insider attack. See infra note 56; Aarti Shahani, Doubts Persist 
on U.S. Claims of North Korean Role in Sony Hack, NPR (Dec. 26, 2014, 4:26 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/12/26/373303733/doubts-persist-
on-u-s-claims-on-north-korean-role-in-sony-hack (discussing the technical difficulty of correctly 
attributing attacks when attackers use obfuscatory or “opsec” measures to cover their tracks).  
 54. See Michael S. Schmidt, Nicole Perlroth & Matthew Goldstein, F.B.I. Says Little Doubt 
North Korea Hit Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/ 
08/business/chief-says-fbi-has-no-doubt-that-north-korea-attacked-sony.html.  
 55. However, open questions remain among computer security experts regarding the 
appropriate attribution of the attack. See Bruce Schneier, Sony’s DRM Rootkit: The Real Story, 
SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 17, 2005, 9:08 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/ 
archives/2005/11/sonys_drm_rootk.html. 
 56. See Marcus J. Ranum, Attribution is Hard, Part 1, TENABLE (Jan. 13, 2015), 
https://www.tenable.com/blog/attribution-is-hard-part-1; Marcus J. Ranum, Attribution is 
3.MATWYSHYN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018 10:45 AM 
1109 CYBER! 
 1119 
was the impression created by some senior government and military 
officials that perhaps they57 may not have fully anticipated58 this 
particular attack59 scenario60—the attack of a nation-state actor on a 
multinational commercial entity.61 In short, the complicated policy 
and forensic aftermath of the Sony compromise highlighted a long-
standing,62 uneasy, and reciprocal relationship63 of corporate 
information security conduct64 and national security matters.65 
 
Hard, Part 2, TENABLE (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.tenable.com/blog/attribution-is-hard-
part-2. 
 57. See Phillip Swarts, NSA Chief Says U.S. Cyber Infrastructure Lags Behind Adversaries, 
Expects Major Attack, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/feb/23/adm-mike-rodgers-nsa-director-says-us-infrastructu/. Mike Rogers, NSA 
Director Admiral, explained he was surprised by the hack and stated, “I didn’t think it’d go 
against the motion picture company, to be quite honest . . . .” Id.; see also Rogers, supra note  22. 
 58.  See Swarts, supra note 57. 
 59.  The attackers remain at large. See Kim Zetter, The Sony Hackers Were Causing 
Mayhem Years Before They Hit the Company, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www. 
wired.com/2016/02/sony-hackers-causing-mayhem-years-hit-company/?mbid=social_twitter. 
 60.  Yet, this threat scenario had been recognized in the private sector for over five years. 
See Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained Access to Sensitive Data, U.S. 
Officials Say, WASH. POST (May 20, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national 
-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say 
/2013/05/20/51330428-be34-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html; Kim Zetter, Google 
Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2010, 8:01 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2010/01/operation-aurora. 
 61.  Some reports indicated, however, that attribution was facilitated by information 
obtained from the National Security Agency. See David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. 
Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-networks 
-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html?_r=0 (“The evidence gathered by the ‘early warning radar’ 
of software painstakingly hidden [by the NSA] to monitor North Korea’s  activities.”). 
 62.  This relationship goes at least as far back as Crypto War I. See Bruce Schneier, History 
of the First Crypto War, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (June 22, 2015, 1:35 PM), https://www. 
schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/06/history_of_the_.html. 
 63.  See Sam Biddle, The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm, INTERCEPT 
(Aug. 19, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-
snowden-documents-confirm/. 
 64.  See Michelle Fox, The Risk of Contractors is Real, Justice Dept. National Security Head 
Says, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/05/the-risk-of-
contractors-is-real-justice-dept-national-security-head-says.html; see also Carol Matlack, Michael 
Riley & Jordan Robertson, The Company Securing Your Internet Has Close Ties to Russian Spies, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
03-19/cybersecurity-kaspersky-has-close-ties-to-russian-spies. 
 65.  The FBI appeared somewhat quick to assert that the attack on Sony originated in 
North Korea. See Alex Hern, FBI Doubles Down on North Korea Accusation for Sony Pictures 
Hack, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2015, 11:07 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology 
/2015/jan/08/fbi-north-korea-accusation-sony-pictures-hack. However, the technical comm-
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This question of the inextricable nature of public-private sector 
security vulnerability surfaced again six months later. In June 2015,66 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that it had 
suffered at least two large data breaches,67 implicating a private sector 
contractor as the responsible party.68 Described by experts as “an 
absolute calamity”69 whose national security impact may last forty 
years or more,70 the breaches exposed over 21 million71 records of 
federal employees,72 including those of covert CIA operatives.73 
Troublingly, investigations74 appear to indicate that the breach was 
likely avoidable75 and that OPM had a “long history of systemic 
 
unity of security experts remained unconvinced in significant part regarding North Korea’s 
involvement. E.g., Bruce Schneier, We Still Don’t Know Who Hacked Sony, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/we-still-dont-know-wh 
o-hacked-sony-north-korea/384198. 
 66.  Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, First on CNN: U.S. Data Hack May Be 4 Times 
Larger than the Government Originally Said, CNN (June 24, 2015, 2:59 AM), http://edition. 
cnn.com/2015/06/22/politics/opm-hack-18-milliion/index.html. 
 67. Cyber Security Resource Center, U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT., https://
www.opm.gov/cybersecurity (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). For a discussion of the OPM 
compromise, see, for example, Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 
Million People, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-
affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/. See, e.g., Kenneth Corbin, How OPM 
Data Breach Could Have Been Prevented, CIO (July 13, 2015, 4:10 AM), http://www.cio.com/ 
article/2947453/data-breach/how-opm-data-breach-could-have-been-prevented.html. 
 68.  See Aaron Boyd, Contractor Breach Gave Hackers Keys to OPM Data, FED. TIMES 
(June 23, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/omr/opm-cyber-report/ 
2015/06/23/keypoint-usis-opm-breach/28977277/. 
 69.  Andrew Tilghman & David B. Larter, Military Clearance OPM Data Breach 
‘Absolute Calamity’, NAVY TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.navytimes.com/story 
/military/2015/06/17/sf-86-security-clearance-breach-troops-affected-opm/28866125/. 
 70.  See Dan Verton, Impact of OPM Breach Could Last More than 40 Years, 
FEDSCOOP  (July 10, 2015), http://fedscoop.com/opm-losses-a-40-year-problem-for-intel 
ligence-community. 
 71.  This figure is over five times larger than OPM’s original estimates. See Corbin, supra 
note 67. 
 72.  See Joe Davidson, New OPM Data Breach Numbers Leave Federal Employees 
Anguished, Outraged, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/new-opm-data-breach-numbers-leave-federal-employees-angu 
ished-outraged/. 
 73.  See Nakashima, supra note 67. 
 74.  Perhaps most tellingly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office had rated the 
OPM cybersecurity apparatus a “D.” Kaveh Waddell, OPM Just Now Figured Out How Much 
Data It Owns, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2015/11/opm-just-figured-out-how-much-data-it-owns/417669/. 
 75.  See Corbin, supra note 67. 
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failures to properly manage its IT infrastructure.”76 Although the facts 
differed from the Sony breach, again the private and public sector 
elements of security co-mingled inextricably. This problem of 
interdependence of public and private sector information security is 
what we might term the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability. 
1. Cyber is sad:77 The problem of reciprocal security vulnerability 
I don’t know about you, but I intend to write a strongly 
worded letter to the White Star Line about all of this. 
—Jack, Titanic78 
 
As the Sony and OPM compromises illustrate, information 
security problems are often not discrete, organizational problems. 
They are instead often cross-cutting, sector-neutral problems that 
impact third parties. The reason is a technical one: effective security 
requires vigilant coordination across institutional and legal silos 
wherever the particular vulnerable code has been deployed. In other 
words, technologically speaking, we need to fix all the vulnerable 
systems in both the public and the private sector because the 
compromise of either could potentially lead to compromise of both. 
Public sector and private sector information security concerns cannot 
be discretely cabined off from each other.79 This technical reality 
underpins the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability. 
The problem of reciprocal security vulnerability is pervasive. 
Vulnerable critical infrastructure systems—smart grids,80 power and 
 
 76.  Id. (quoting IT Spending and Data Security at OPM Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Appropriations, 114th Cong (2015) (statement of Michael R. Esser, Assistant Inspector 
General for Audits), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Esser%20
Testimony.pdf). 
 77.  Keanu Is Sad / Sad Keanu, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/me 
mes/keanu-is-sad-sad-keanu (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
 78.  TITANIC (Paramount Pictures 1997). 
 79.  For example, the infamous Heartbleed vulnerability impacted both public and private 
systems. See Julie Pace, HealthCare.gov Website Flagged in Heartbleed Review, NBC 10 (Apr. 19, 
2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/Heartbleed-
computer-bug-Open-SSL-Homeland-Security-Department-HealthCaregov-President-Obama-
healthcare-cybersecurity-255850391.html. 
 80.  See, e.g., CAL. STATE UNIV. SACRAMENTO, SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY 
POTENTIAL THREATS, VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS (2012), http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2012publications/CEC-500-2012-047/CEC-500-2012-047.pdf. 
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water stations,81 air traffic control systems82 and other communication 
systems,83 health systems,84 and nuclear power plants85—all blend 
private and public-sector elements, simultaneously impacting both 
national security and consumer protection concerns. For example, 
some nuclear submarines run a version of Windows XP, a private sector 
operating system.86 With the right malware, compromised networks of 
personal computers,87 consumer smartphones,88 and even Internet of 
Things (IoT) webcams89 can easily be remotely repurposed for 
 
 81.  See Kim Zetter, Researchers Uncover Holes that Open Power Stations to Hacking, 
WIRED (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/10/ics/. 
 82.  See Heather Kelly, Researcher: New Air Traffic Control System is Hackable, 
CNN  (July  26, 2012, 6:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/tech/web/air-traffic-
control-security. 
 83.  See NAT’L CYBER SEC. DIV. CONTROL SYS. SEC. PROGRAM, POTENTIAL 
VULNERABILITIES IN MUNICIPAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (2006), https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Potential_Vulnerabilities_Municipal_Communication
s_Networks_v1_S508C.pdf. 
 84.  See, e.g., Dan Kaplan, Indiana University Hospital Hacked to Steal Data, SC 
MEDIA,  http://www.scmagazine.com/indiana-university-hospital-hacked-to-steal-data/articl 
e/225887/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).  
 85.  See Andy Greenberg, America’s Hackable Backbone, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2007, 
6:00  PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/22/scada-hackers-infrastructure-tech-security-
cx_ag_0822hack.html. 
 86. See Kyle Mizokami, Britain’s Doomsday Nuke Subs Still Run Windows XP, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a19061
/britains-doomsday-subs-run-windows-xp/. 
 87.  See Andy Greenberg, Hackers Are Already Using the Shellshock Bug to Launch Botnet 
Attacks, WIRED (Sept. 25, 2014, 4:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/09/hackers-
already-using-shellshock-bug-create-botnets-ddos-attacks/. 
 88.  See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, First Case of Android Trojan Spreading Via Mobile 
Botnets Discovered, ZDNET (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/first-case-of-
android-trojan-spreading-via-mobile-botnets-discovered-7000020292/. 
 89.  See Lily Hay Newman, The Botnet that Broke the Internet Isn’t Going Away, WIRED 
(Dec. 9, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isnt-
going-away/. 
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attacking critical national assets90 such as stock exchanges,91 dams,92 or 
power grids.93 
To crystalize the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability, let us 
briefly analyze a case study of another Sony public relations nightmare. 
In 2005, Sony imprudently deployed overzealous digital rights 
management (DRM)94 technology in some of its music CDs. This 
DRM code has been described by experts as a rootkit—a security-
invasive tool used by malicious attackers to open a backdoor into a 
system while hiding from the machine’s owner.95 Although Sony 
considered this security-invasive DRM to be a reasonable exercise of 
the type of intellectual property protection96 authorized by the 
DMCA, the practical result was a national security emergency.97 
Unsuspecting federal and private sector employees played Sony music 
CDs infected with this DRM in their work machines, which caused 
the security compromise of “many military and government 
networks,”98 including the networks of the Department of Defense 
 
 90.  Purchasing time on a botnet for purposes of attacking infrastructure is relatively 
inexpensive. See Dancho Danchev, Study Finds the Average Price for Renting a Botnet, ZDNET 
(May 26, 2010, 7:16 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/study-finds-the-average-price-for-
renting-a-botnet/. The price for botnet creation kits has now fallen to approximately $20. 
See  Tim G., Renting a Zombie Farm: Botnets and the Hacker Economy, SYMANTEC 
(Aug.  8,  2014), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/renting-zombie-farm-botnets-
and-hacker-economy. 
 91.  See, e.g., Michael Riley, How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq, BLOOMBERG (July 
21, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-17/how-russian-hack 
ers-stole-the-nasdaq. 
 92.  See, e.g., Joseph Berger, A Dam, Small and Unsung, Is Caught Up in an Iranian 
Hacking Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/ 
nyregion/rye-brook-dam-caught-in-computer-hacking-case.html?_r=0. 
 93.  See, e.g., Jamie Condliffe, Ukraine’s Power Grid Gets Hacked Again, a Worrying 
Sign  for Infrastructure Attacks, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.technologyre 
view.com/s/603262/ukraines-power-grid-gets-hacked-again-a-worrying-sign-for-infrastructur 
e-attacks/. 
 94. Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too 
Far, MICROSOFT: MARK’S BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 AM), https://blogs.technet.microsoft. 
com/markrussinovich/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-
far/. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Schneier, supra note 55. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Robert Lemos, Researcher: Sony BMG “Rootkit” Still Widespread, SECURITYFOCUS 
(Jan. 16, 2006), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11369. 
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and the Department of Homeland Security.99 Security experts estimate 
that over 500,000 networks were compromised by the Sony DRM,100 
and owners alleged millions of dollars of damage to those systems.101 
In other words, private sector computer code caused a national 
security problem. 
Now, more than a decade later, flawed code102 in IoT103 devices 
exposes consumers, public104 and private sector employers,105 and our 
national defense to security risks in somewhat parallel ways. As 
Professors Scott Peppet106 and Paul Ohm107 have correctly noted in the 
context of IoT, the legal discussion about regulating software changes 
 
 99. Schneier, supra note 55. 
 100. Lemos, supra note 98 (“[R]esearch . . . suggested some 570,000 networks had 
computers affected by the software . . . .”). 
 101. Ingrid Marson, Sony Settles ‘Rootkit’ Class Action Lawsuit, C|NET (Dec. 29, 2005, 
9:17 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/sony-settles-rootkit-class-action-lawsuit/; see also 
Elizabeth Bowles & Eran Kahana, The ‘Agreement’ that Sparked a Storm, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 
& Feb. 2007, https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2007-01-02/kahana.shtml. 
 102. For example, in one study, HP Fortify analyzed ten IoT devices in 2015, and found 
that each device had about twenty-five vulnerabilities. HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERS., INTERNET 
OF THINGS RESEARCH STUDY: 2015 REPORT (2015), http://h20195.www2.hp.com/ 
V2/GetDocument.aspx?docname=4AA5-4759ENW&cc=us&lc=en; see also Matthew Sparkes, 
Average Internet of Things Device Has 25 Security Flaws, TELEGRAPH (July 30, 2014, 
11:26  AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/11000013/Average-
Internet-of-Things-device-has-25-security-flaws.html. 
 103. According to the FTC, “[t]he Internet of Things (‘IoT’) refers to the ability of 
everyday objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive data.” FTC STAFF, 
INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, at ii (2015), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-novemb 
er-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
 104. Pacemakers have similarly raised security concerns. See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, Yes, 
Terrorists Could Have Hacked Dick Cheney’s Heart, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/21/yes-terrorists-could-
have-hacked-dick-cheneys-heart. 
 105. For example, vulnerable Internet of Things devices risk compromising corporate 
networks. See Mark Piesing, Hacking Attacks on Printers Still Not Being Taken Seriously, 
GUARDIAN (July  23,  2012, 6:29 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/ 
jul/23/hacking-attack-printers. 
 106. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014) (arguing sensor-based 
technologies including the Internet of Things devices will be inherently prone to security flaws, 
and the difficulty of meaningful consumer consent in this context can create discrimination, 
privacy, security, and consent problems). 
 107. Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672 (2016) (arguing that a shift in the modern administrative state is 
underway from the regulation of things to the regulation of code). 
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when software becomes part108 of most products.109 IoT products can 
be leveraged to surreptitiously compromise the confidentiality of 
systems,110 attack others’ systems,111 put employers112 or children at 
risk,113 and even physically114 harm115 their human owners.116 These 
problems exist regardless of whether the vulnerable devices are 
deployed in the public or private sector. 
Legal scholars and policymakers have generally failed to recognize 
this problem of reciprocal security vulnerability as dispositive for the 
ways that we regulate security. As such, the two dominant legal 
 
 108. Code errors also have also been found in IoT medical devices including radiation 
machines. At least six people died or were seriously injured due to a software malfunction, 
security flaw or vulnerability in the Therac 25 radiation machine. See Nancy G. Leveson & Clark 
S. Turner, An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents, COMPUTER, July 1993, at 18. 
 109. For a discussion of product liability and IoT, see, for example, Mauricio Paez & Mike 
La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 
29  (2016) (analyzing unsettled legal issues for businesses to consider when evaluating 
IoT  adoption). 
 110. Even our smart toilets can be compromised—a truly crappy state of information 
security affairs. See Kashmir Hill, When ‘Smart Homes’ Get Hacked, FORBES (July 26, 2013, 9:15 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/26/smart-homes-hack/. 
 111.  IoT cameras were recently harnessed as part of the Mirai botnet. For a discussion of 
Mirai, see, for example, Newman, supra note 89. 
 112. See, e.g., William J. Barath, The Internet of Things: Don’t Forget Your Employees, 
LAW360 (Sept. 2, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/836130/the-internet-
of-things-don-t-forget-your-employees. 
 113. For example, baby monitors have experienced vulnerabilities allowing remote 
attackers to monitor children. See, e.g., Nitesh Dhanjani, The Belkin WeMo Baby Monitor, the 
WeMo Switch, and the Wi-Fi NetCam, DHANJANI.COM (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www. 
dhanjani.com/blog/2013/10/the-belkin-wemo-baby-monitor-the-wemo-switch-and-the-wi-
fi-netcam.html (reviewing vulnerabilities in a specific internet camera). 
 114. At least one person has boasted of remotely modifying the thermostat of his ex-
spouse. See Guy Trolls His Ex-wife via Programmable Thermostat, REDDIT, https://www.reddit. 
com/r/ProRevenge/comments/2cme0c/guy_trolls_his_exwife_via_programmable_thermosta
t/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 115. A vulnerable toaster could potentially be made to overheat and start a fire. Water 
heaters could be made to explode potentially, if settings are manipulable. See Kashmir Hill, 
The  Terrifying Search Engine That Finds Internet-Connected Cameras, Traffic Lights, 
Medical  Devices,  Baby Monitors and Power Plants, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2013, 10:35 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/09/04/shodan-terrifying-search-engine/# 
4b268b0f525d. 
 116. IoT medical devices present a similar list of troubling vulnerabilities. Insulin pumps 
have presented security threats. See, e.g., Jordan Robertson, McAfee Hacker Says Medtronic 
Insulin Pumps Vulnerable to Attack, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/mcafee-hacker-says-medtronic-insulin-pumps-vulnerable-
to-attack.html. 
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“cybersecurity” paradigms—information sharing and deterrence—are 
not an ideal fit. 
2. Cybering so hard:117 Information sharing and deterrence 
Politicians, like generals, have a tendency to fight the 
last  war. 
—John Bolton118 
 
Although information security professionals warned Congress of 
the dire state of security over fifteen years ago,119 widespread political 
acknowledgment and legal interest in this “emerging national crisis”120 
has only recently emerged. Despite intense,121 recent Congressional 
interest122 in “cybersecurity,”123 or simply “cyber,”124 the two 
dominant legal approaches to information security—information 
 
 117. Adulting, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/adulting (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 118. See Robert Mann, This Is Why David Vitter Lost: Gutter Politics from a Prostitute-
Procuring Politician Don’t Work Against a Conservative Democrat from West Point, SALON (Nov. 
22, 2015, 3:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/11/22/this_is_why_david_vitter_lost_ 
gutter_politics_from_a_prostitute_procuring_politician_dont_work_against_a_conservative_de
mocrat_from_west_point/ (“‘Politicians, like generals, have a tendency to fight the last war.’ — 
John Bolton”). 
 119. Craig Timberg, Net of Insecurity: A Disaster Foretold — and Ignored, WASH. POST 
(June 22, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/06/22/net-of-insec 
urity-part-3/; Computer Security in Government: Is the Public at Risk?: Hearing Before S. Comm. 
On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=VVJldn_MmMY. 
 120. See O’Neill, supra note 20 (testimony of Professor Blaze). 
 121. At least 105 proposals related to “cybersecurity” were introduced during the 2015 
legislative session. David J. Bender, Congress Passes the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, NAT. L. 
REV.  (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-cybersecurity-
act-2015. 
 122. See, e.g., Promoting and Incentivizing Cybersecurity Best Practices: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the H. Comm. of Homeland 
Sec.,  114th CONG. 1 (2015), https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-
promoting-and-incentivizing-cybersecurity-best-practices. 
 123. For an explanation of why “cybersecurity” is a suboptimal term, see infra 
Section  II.B.3. 
 124. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY (2015), https:// 
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER 
_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf (explaining that “Cyber” is a prefix, not a noun). 
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sharing125 and deterrence126—are unfortunately primarily a rehashing 
of last century’s legal approaches. As such, they are a suboptimal fit 
for grappling with this century’s security challenges, challenges whose 
hallmark feature is the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability. 
a. Information sharing. Information sharing paradigms have been 
used for decades in various regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives.127 
They underpin bodies of law, such as securities regulation128 and patent 
law,129 in which certain benefits are granted in exchange for socially 
useful self-reporting. As Professor Julie Cohen has argued, the 
discourse of information policy reform has also often been organized 
principally around the theme of access to information.130 Therefore, it 
is perhaps unsurprising131 that information sharing is the paradigm at 
the heart of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.132 Specifically, the Act 
 
 125. See infra text accompanying notes 127–39. 
 126. See infra text accompanying notes 140–78. 
 127. For a discussion of information sharing, see, for example, Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 (2001) (“The ever-widening appreciation of 
the role of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment in the formulation of 
administrative policy testifies to this need; so too does the emerging call for experimentalism and 
information sharing . . . .”) (citation omitted); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1986) (“[U]ntil the New Deal, a policing 
model of regulation invariably triumphed over efforts to elicit government support for various 
forms of business price-fixing, information-sharing and market-allocating schemes—regulatory 
initiatives which I will refer to as associational forms of regulation.”); David J. Teece, 
Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465 (1994).  
 128. See, e.g., Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings 
Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. 
L. REV. 1114 (1987) (explaining historical reliance of securities regulation on information 
disclosure and sharing obligations); Brian Lewis et al., Securities Fraud, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1567, 1634 (2015) (“Most recently, the SEC became a signatory to the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’) MOU, the first global multilateral 
information-sharing arrangement.”).  
 129. See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1565, 1588 (2016) (discussing patent law as a system of information coordination where 
“success is measured by the amount of privately beneficial information sharing that occurs in 
reliance on patent rights”). 
 130. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND 
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 223 (2012) (“Within U.S. legal and policy circles, the 
discourse of information policy reform has been organized principally around the themes of 
access to knowledge and network neutrality.”). 
 131. See, Derek E. Bambauer, Sharing Shortcomings, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 465 (2015) 
(“Current cybersecurity policy emphasizes increasing the sharing of threat and vulnerability 
information. Legal reform is seen as crucial to enabling this exchange . . . .”). 
 132. See Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 102(13), 129 Stat. 2242, 
2938 (2015). 
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created a regime in which entities are encouraged to voluntarily 
“monitor” their “information system” for “cybersecurity purposes.”133 
The Act granted authority to use defensive measures134 and to provide 
information to a federal or nonfederal entity in exchange for a 
limitation of liability135 under the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA)136 and other privacy laws.137 
Superficially, such an approach may appear to target the problem 
of reciprocal security vulnerability. However, upon closer inspection, 
it actually may obscure and exacerbate the problem. Professor Orin 
Kerr has correctly argued that a lack of definitional clarity exists 
regarding what constitutes a “cybersecurity purpose” for purposes of 
the Act.138 Similarly, the Act creates a voluntary information sharing 
regime in which the most egregious security deficits may also be the 
most likely to go undisclosed and unaddressed in both the public and 
private sector. 
As Part IV will explain, most security information sharing statutes 
fail to address a dispositive, pre-existing problem: a deficit in the 
underlying information “infrastructures” required to create accurate 
and meaningful technical context for the shared security information. 
These types of information security infrastructures are necessary 
precursors to effective private and public-sector information sharing 
regimes.139 Without first correcting underlying security infrastructure 
 
 133. See id. § 104(a). 
 134. See id. § 104(b). 
 135. See id. § 106. 
 136. For a discussion of ECPA’s approach, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide 
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1208 (2004) (explaining the historical background and structure of ECPA). 
 137. See, e.g., Jennifer Granick, OmniCISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and the FTC on User 
Privacy, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 16, 2015, 6:09 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28386 
/omnicisa-pits-government-against-self-privacy/. 
 138. See Orin Kerr, How Does the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Change the Internet Surveillance 
Laws?, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir 
acy/wp/2015/12/24/how-does-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-change-the-internet-surveilla 
nce-laws/. 
 139. For example, this lesson regarding how absence of infrastructures results in 
information sharing failures was amply demonstrated by the Books and Records Crisis in the 
financial markets in the late 1960s-early 1970s. For a discussion of the Books and Records Crisis, 
see, for example, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Corporate Cyborgs and Technology Risks, 11 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 573, 573–74 (2010) (“Using the securities industry as a case study . . . this article 
points to the historical example of the Books and Records Crisis that plagued the securities 
markets in the 1960s and 1970s and required SEC intervention.”). 
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deficits, information-sharing approaches that trade liability limitation 
for voluntary security “information” are limited in their effectiveness 
from  inception. 
b. Deterrence. In any circumstance involving criminal conduct, a 
superficially appealing and uncontroversial legal paradigm will be 
rooted in deterrence. In theory, subsequent sanctions for computer 
intrusions and security violations might dissuade would-be 
perpetrators from engaging in criminality. As explained by Professor 
Daniel Medwed,140 deterrence has long been a core goal of 
criminal  law, law enforcement, and defense initiatives.141 To wit, the 
Department of Justice’s dominant enforcement paradigm in 
approaching information security can be described as one focused on 
deterrence,142 and U.S. Cyber Command identifies deterrence as a key 
goal,143 although disagreement exists regarding what exactly this 
deterrence posture means in practice.144 
But, in practice, because of the problem of reciprocal security 
vulnerability, the picture is more complex than contemplated by these 
usual models of deterrence. Attackers’ behaviors and strategies strain 
these traditional notions of deterrence, with respect to both definition, 
on the one hand, and enforcement reality, on the other.145 Even if we 
assume for the sake of argument that the meaning of deterrence is 
 
 140. See Daniel S. Medwed, Deterrence Theory and the Corporate Criminal Actor: Professor 
Utset’s Fresh Take on an Old Problem, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 329, 329 (2013) (“Deterrence is a core 
theory underlying much of American criminal law.”). 
 141.  For discussion of the role of deterrence in criminal law, see, for example, Steven 
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985) (analyzing the theoretically optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions 
as a deterrent); Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 931, 937 (1984) (explaining the role of deterrence in criminal law and arguing 
that “restitution is best suited to the criminal sphere” rather than a deterrence focus). 
 142.  See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1656 (2003) (“In the context of computer 
crimes, the most important of these utilitarian goals is deterrence . . . .”). 
 143.  Leticia Hopkins, Fighting in the Cyber Domain: US Army Central Creates Cyberspace 
Strategy, U.S. ARMY (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/180101/fighting
_in_the_cyber_domain_us_army_central_creates_cyberspace_strategy (“The strategy seeks to 
deter current and emerging threats . . . .”). 
 144.  See Jan Kallberg, After Twenty Years of Cyber – Still Unchartered Territory Ahead, 
CYBER DEF. REV. (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2016/12/28/after-
twenty-years-of-cyber/ (“From a military standpoint, there is still a debate about what cyber 
deterrence would look like . . . .”). 
 145.  Id. 
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straightforward in U.S. domestic criminal contexts, information 
security criminality and deterrence are not solely domestic.146 As a 
result, at least two different (sets of) field-specific definitions of 
“deterrence” currently clash in information security—one from 
domestic criminal law and the other from international relations 
theory.147 While the domestic definition of deterrence involves 
discouraging criminals from engaging in crime, the international 
relations framing of “deterrence” questions is more complex. 
Questions of information security on an international level also involve 
national security questions of international criminality, espionage, and 
international conflict.148 As explained by Ann-Marie Slaughter, several 
different schools of thought exist with respect to international 
relations theory,149 and each of these schools analyzes questions of 
“deterrence” differently.150  
With respect to enforcement, the practical difficulties of attack 
attribution and logistics of criminal prosecution across international 
boundaries make successful deterrence less likely. Therefore, even 
assuming domestic information security criminality can be partially 
deterred,151 international criminality, particularly criminality arising 
 
 146.  Tonya L. Putnam & David D. Elliott, International Responses to Cyber Crime, in THE 
TRASNATIONAL DIMENSION OF CYBER CRIME AND TERRORISM 35 (Abraham D. Sofaer & 
Seymour E. Goodman eds., 2001), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/doc 
uments/0817999825_35.pdf (“Concerned technical experts well understand that information 
security issues are inherently and unavoidably global in nature.”). 
 147.  For a discussion of various theories and strategies of deterrence in international 
contexts, see, for example, Branislav L. Slantchev, Introduction to International Relations Lecture 
8: Deterrence and Compellence, U.C. SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2005), http://slantchev.ucsd. 
edu/courses/ps12/08-deterrence-and-compellence.pdf. 
 148.  See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication 
of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1084 (1973) (“[F]or deterrence purposes the 
penalties for espionage are and should be exceptionally steep.”); Melanie J. Teplinsky, 
Cybersecurity and the Cyberthreat Deterrence Trend, in RECENT TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW (2015 ed.) (“The goal of threat deterrence is to make cyber espionage so costly that it no 
longer pays. Cyber espionage can be made more costly through improved detection, attribution, 
and punishment of cyber intruders.”). 
 149.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal Theories, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (Wolfrum, R. ed., 2011), https://www.princeton.edu/~ 
slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Not all commentators agree that deterrence presents the most desirable strategy in 
either traditional criminal law contexts or technology contexts. See, e.g., Victim Restitution, supra 
note 141 (explaining the role of deterrence in criminal law and arguing that “restitution is best 
suited to the criminal sphere” rather than a deterrence focus). 
3.MATWYSHYN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018 10:45 AM 
1109 CYBER! 
 1131 
from countries without extradition agreements with the United States 
or with interests adverse to the United States, is highly unlikely to be 
substantially deterred. Attacks also often come from non-state actors152 
outside U.S. jurisdictional reach.153 While it is true that these non-state 
actors sometimes work at the request of a hostile foreign group or 
nation state, they nevertheless upend the traditional power 
asymmetries that have worked in favor of law enforcement.154 
Although non-state actors155 have historically faced challenges in 
obtaining and deploying conventional weapons in physical space, the 
right security vulnerability and exploit for an attack may be available 
for purchase or discovery from the comfort of home.156 An effective 
 
 152.  See, e.g., George Jackson, Hayden: Rogue Attacks are the Biggest Cyber Threat, 
GOVERNMENT MATTERS (June 2, 2016), http://govmatters.tv/hayden-rogue-attacks-are-
the-biggest-cyber-threat/. 
 153.  Professor Susan Brenner and a co-author explain that: 
Courts have invoked four different bases, or “nexuses,” to justify their exercise of 
jurisdiction in criminal cases: (1) the territorial nexus, i.e., where the offense was 
committed; (2) the nationality of the person committing the offense; (3) a protective 
nexus that allows the exercise of jurisdiction when a national interest of the forum state 
is at stake; and (4) the universality nexus which gives courts jurisdiction over 
“certain  offenses that are recognized by the community of nations as being of 
universal  concern.” 
Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, 4 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 1, 8 n.25 (2004) (quoting Ray August, International Cyber-jurisdiction: A Comparative 
Analysis, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 531, 534 (2002)). 
 154.  Traditionally, warfare has been contemplated as a conflict between two nations, and 
international relations theory has generally defined a state as a group of people with a territory, 
a language and a military. These traditional definitions strain in the context of attacks that happen 
partially through the Internet. See, e.g., Slantchev, supra note 147. 
 155.  For a discussion of non-state actors and their impact on international crime, see, for 
example, Robert McLaughlin, Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors 
Responsible for Environmental Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 387 (2000) 
(“[R]ecognition of the role of non-state international actors in IEL has allowed some shift of 
focus toward identifying ‘the author of the damage,’ as opposed to recognizing only state 
responsibility for obligations.” (quoting Alexandre Kiss, Present Limits to the Enforcement of 
State  Responsibility for Environmental Damage, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 3, 14 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991))); Kimberley 
N. Trapp, The Use of Force Against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1049, 1050 (2009) (“By requiring that ‘armed attacks’ by non-state terrorist actors be 
attributable to the host state in whose territory defensive force is used, the violation of the host 
state’s territorial integrity is excused.”). 
 156.  See Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List For Hackers’ Secret Software 
Exploits, FORBES (Mar 23, 2012, 9:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreen 
berg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits/ 
#20cc4e7a2660. 
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exploit can be leveraged by small numbers of people to remotely cause 
physical harms directly to civilians through vulnerabilities in those 
citizens’ commercial products and infrastructure.157 The recent shut-
down of Ukrainian power grids through code attributed to (but 
disclaimed by) Russia  demonstrates this dynamic.158 This comparative 
ease of such an  attack  renders traditional deterrence analysis in either 
international  relations159 or criminal law160 theory a poor fit for 
guiding information  security. 
A misguided focus on deterrence has also led some legal scholars 
to argue in broad strokes for speech-related restrictions, specifically 
suggesting restrictions on informational speech about security 
vulnerabilities but for a narrow set of conduct covered by a proposed 
statutory “safe harbor”161 and legal rules broadly prohibiting the sales 
of exploits.162 But such proposals are likely incompatible in substantial 
part with the broader protections of the First Amendment for 
informational speech,163 the Copyright Office’s more generous 
 
 157.  See Condliffe, supra note 15; Pavel Polityuk, Ukraine Investigates Suspected Cyber 
Attack On Kiev Power Grid, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016, 8:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber-attacks-idUSKBN1491ZF; Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, 
Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www. 
wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/; Kim Zetter, 
The Ukrainian Power Grid Was Hacked Again, MOTHERBOARD (Jan 10, 2017, 8:07 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ukrainian-power-station-hacking-december-20 
16-report. 
 158.  Zetter, The Ukrainian Power Grid Was Hacked Again, supra note 157. 
 159.  See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 160.  See supra text accompanying notes 150–53. 
 161.  Such proposals put the burden on the researcher to functionally obtain permission 
to speak and do not consider the nuances and practical difficulties experienced by security 
researchers attempting to disclose vulnerabilities. See Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The 
Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1089 (2011) (“The first conduct-based rule would require 
a researcher who discovers a security vulnerability to report it to the vendor of the affected 
software before publishing any information about the flaw.”). 
 162.  See id. at 1090 (proposing an affirmative defense where researchers must comport 
with a series of behavior rules, for example, “[t]he second behavior rule would ban sales of 
vulnerability data to third parties”). 
 163.  See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First 
Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 795 (2013) (“Using the case study of ‘vulnerability 
speech’—speech that identifies a potentially critical flaw in a technological system but may 
indirectly facilitate criminality—this Article proposes a four-part ‘repurposed speech scale’ for 
crafting the outer boundaries of First Amendment protection for informational speech.”). 
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interpretation of copyright law,164 and the nuanced realities165 of 
information security in practice.166 Perhaps most importantly, such 
proposals fail to grapple with the problem of reciprocal security 
vulnerability in an adequately granular manner.167 Vulnerability and 
exploit “purchasers” are not solely rogue non-state actors168 and 
foreign governments seeking to attack U.S. systems.169 They also 
include both public and private sector U.S. entities seeking to defend 
their systems170 and improve the code in their products171—products 
 
 164.  See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65944-01 (Oct. 28, 2015) (codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 201) (“Based on this record, the Register recommended adopting an exemption to enable 
good-faith security research on computer programs within devices or machines primarily 
designed for use by individual consumers (including voting machines), motorized land vehicles, 
and implanted medical devices and their corresponding monitoring systems.”). 
 165.  Sometimes vulnerabilities impact such a large number of vendors that notifying each 
impacted party is impracticable. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTH TRIENNIAL 1201 
RULEMAKING HEARINGS 36 (2015), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/hearing-
transcripts/1201-Rulemaking-Public-Roundtable-05-26-2015.pdf (“Indeed, just last week, 
Professor Green, Professor Heninger . . . and a number of their colleagues released a report 
disclosing the logjam vulnerability in the core protocol we use to keep the Web secure.”). 
 166.  For example, the finder of a security flaw may be an accidental finder or a curious 
teen, not a professional security researcher. See, e.g., Michael Mimoso, Meet the 18-Year-Old Who 
Hacked the Pentagon, THREATPOST (June 21, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://threatpost.com/meet-
the-18-year-old-who-hacked-the-pentagon/118802/. 
 167.  For example, one set of authors advocates restricting truthful speech about security 
vulnerabilities through a narrow safe harbor ostensibly because standardized vulnerability price 
lists have not emerged. See Bambauer & Day, supra note 161, at 1100 (“Even once a willing 
seller locates, and communicates with, a willing buyer, the parties will have difficulty coming to 
terms due to information asymmetry. There is no price list, or set of criteria, to determine what 
a bug is worth.”). However, as a practical matter of security, bug bounty programs and private 
sector intermediaries do offer precisely that kind of pricing guidance. See generally BUGCROWD, 
https://bugcrowd.com/programs (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); Bug Bounty Programs, 
HACKERONE, https://hackerone.com/bug-bounty-programs (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 168.  See Nicole Arce, Hacking Team Warns Hacked Data and Codes Can Be Used By 
Cybercriminals and Terrorists, TECH TIMES (July 10, 2015, 7:22 AM), http://www.tech 
times.com/articles/67377/20150710/hacking-team-warns-hacked-data-and-codes-can-be-us 
ed-by-cybercriminals-and-terrorists.htm. 
 169.  Sui-Lee Wee & Alexel Oreskovic, Google Reveals Gmail Hacking, Says Likely from 
China, REUTERS (June 1, 2011, 9:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-
hacking-idUSTRE7506U320110602. 
 170.  In fact, an industry of bug purchasing intermediaries has arisen to assist companies 
in buying information about their vulnerabilities and running bug bounty programs. 
HACKERONE, https://www.hackerone.com/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 171.  For example, Facebook has paid out over $5 million in bug bounties to make its code 
more secure. Liam Tung, Facebook’s Bug Bounty: Now it’s Paid Out $5m for Security Flaws to 900 
Hunters, ZDNET (Oct. 13, 2016, 11:47 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/facebooks-bug-
bounty-now-its-paid-out-5m-for-security-flaws-to-900-hunters/. 
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often deployed simultaneously in both the public and private sector.172 
Particularly because vulnerability finders and exploit (re)sellers are 
often not U.S. citizens,173 U.S. deterrence-driven prohibitions will 
neither reach them nor make prosecution more feasible. 
But, one might ask, if information sharing and deterrence (using 
either definition174) are not an optimal fit for a world defined by 
reciprocal security vulnerability, why have lawmakers and scholars175 
repeatedly embraced these two flawed paradigms for “cybersecurity”? 
The section that follows identifies a series of underlying theoretical 
errors  and structural deficits that have led us to today’s “cyberized” 
legal  paradigms. 
B. CyberFacepalm:176 The Three CyberFlaws 
You keep using that word. I do not think that it means 
what you think it means. 
—Inigo Montoya177 
 
Legal scholarship on topics related to information security has 
increased substantially in the last five years.178 In addition to neglecting 
the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability, this newer scholarship 
usually refers to information security using the imprecise policy 
term  “cybersecurity.” Three analytical flaws plague both this 
 
 172.  Nuclear submarines, for example, can run on a variant of Windows. See Mizokami, 
supra note 86. 
 173.  The first reported vulnerability in the Hack the Pentagon program was reported by 
a foreign national, for example. For comments of Lisa Wiswell, see Bug Bounty, YOUTUBE (Dec. 
20, 2016) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acWWT2R3LiI&index=15&list=PLtUuPz3a
0Gz-PJOFb55O6jDZ68Ya9O9eS. 
 174.  See supra text accompanying notes 145–50. 
 175.  Within the last five years, “cybersecurity” practice groups have sprung up seemingly 
ubiquitously in law firms. Orin Kerr, What is ‘Cybersecurity Law’?, WASH. POST (May 14, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/14/what-is-cyber 
security-law/. But, as Professor Orin Kerr has again correctly pointed out, “[i]f you look closely, 
though, there isn’t much clarity about what ‘cybersecurity law’ actually means.” Id. 
 176.  Facepalm, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/facepalm 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 177.  THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1987). 
 178.  For example, a Westlaw query on “hackers” appearing at least twenty times in law 
review articles, yields approximately 150 results. Over half of these articles have been written in 
the last five years. The remaining half was written between 1986 and 2010. 
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“cybersecurity” legal scholarship and policy discourse—privacy 
conflation, incommensurability, and internet exceptionalism. 
1. Ermahgerd, cybers:179 Privacy conflation 
Perhaps the most common error made by “cybersecurity” scholars 
and policymakers involves attempting to somehow cram security into 
the more familiar (and more subjective) legal box of privacy. This 
analytical error might be termed the mistake of privacy conflation. 
More colloquially, we might call this the “security-as-privacy-with-
cybersprinkles” problem. Scholarship and policy suffering from the 
privacy conflation error mistakenly frame information security law as 
inextricably reliant upon and subservient to privacy law. Therefore, 
privacy conflated work argues, security must be subject to all of privacy 
law’s doctrinal, social, and normative messiness.180 In other words, the 
mistake of privacy conflation is the erroneous belief held by many legal 
scholars and policymakers that information security is merely a 
subfield of, or contingent upon, privacy law and, consequently, that it 
is similarly socially-constructed.181 
For example, one legal scholar has argued that security merely 
“implements privacy’s choices”182 and that the “futile obsession”183 
with preventing breaches184 should be replaced with a focus on simply 
mitigating them post-occurrence.185 But, this argument strains 
 
 179.  Ermahgerd, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ermahgerd 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 180.  See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 
791–92 (2015) (arguing that “cybersecurity” should be driven by “accuracy” and “accuracy is 
constructed through social processes, rather than emerging from information itself” or 
technical  facts). 
 181. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 667, 676 (2013) (“Security implements privacy’s choices.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2014) 
(“Existing scholarship on cyberespionage and cyberwar is undermined by its futile obsession 
with preventing attacks.”). 
 184. This position has been subsequently adopted by at least one additional scholar. David 
Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 354 (2014) (“[P]rivacy is a 
normative exercise in making ‘decisions about competing claims to legitimate access to, use of, 
and alteration of information.’ Security . . . ‘implements those choices . . . mediat[ing] between 
information and [normative] privacy selections’ about the use of/access to that information.” 
(quoting Bambauer, supra note 181, at 667–68)). 
 185. Id. (“Cybersecurity must focus on mitigating breaches rather than prevent-
ing  them.”). 
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credulity when security of critical infrastructure systems, weapons,186 
hospital equipment, medical devices,187 or connected cars is at stake. A 
single188 exploited code flaw can result in multiple deaths.189 Mitigation 
post-breach is simply not enough, even in superficially low-stakes 
contexts.190 Failing to prevent avoidable losses of human life due to 
errors in your company’s products or services is not legally (or 
morally) acceptable: traditional legal principles dictate that an author 
or operator likely has an affirmative duty to prevent even a single 
security compromise when the means to prevent the harm are readily 
available and severe harm is  foreseeable.191 
Another scholar worries that data can be too secure and that 
security can inhibit “socially useful” data collection—a privacy concern 
that is irrelevant for security.192 Still other privacy-conflated legal 
 
 186. For example, the compromise of a nuclear power reactor, missile system, or nuclear 
submarine offer examples where the optimal level of compromise from the perspective of the 
compromised entity is clearly zero. 
 187. Also, if we are asking a patient wearing a pacemaker the optimal number of intrusions 
for a pacemaker, we can be confident the patient will state the optimal number of times that her 
pacemaker should be compromised by remote attackers is zero. 
 188. Economic-sounding “cybersecurity” arguments are a poor fit for the stakes and 
practical reality of information security law and policy unless we assume that a certain number 
of human lives are expendable. For example, another legal scholar argues that “[t]he optimal 
level of cyber-intrusions is not zero.” Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2013). 
 189. For a discussion of death due to code flaws in a hospital machine, see, for example, 
Leveson & Turner, supra note 108, at 18, 20. 
 190. Even flaws in pedestrian IoT devices can be harnessed into botnets directed at 
disrupting critical infrastructure and healthcare targets. 
 191. For a discussion of the duty to prevent avoidable harms see, for example, Stephen G. 
Gilles, Causation and Responsibility After Coase, Calabresi and Coleman, 16 QLR 255, 273–75 
(1996) (“Today, the rejection of Good Samaritan liability is increasingly seen as an exception to 
‘the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable 
care in the circumstances’ . . . . A person whose activities involve the creation of risk (to self or 
others) is ordinarily by that very fact in a position to reduce or avoid those risks, either by taking 
additional care or by refraining from engaging in the activity. Risk-creators . . . are thus prima 
facie good risk-avoiders. That may be why we normally assume that our causal judgments can 
appropriately be translated into judgments about responsibility” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968))). See also Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden 
Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital 
Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 110 (2010) (“Even if we assume arguendo that a harmed 
consumer will have difficulty quantifying actual damages, an independent duty to warn on the 
part of the digital product creator or operator may still exist.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 264 (2007) (“A 
database operator’s uncertainty about the contours of due care may prompt it to take too much 
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scholarship views security as simply the debate over appropriate notice 
and remedy after the “privacy failure” of a data breach193 or a failure 
in compliance.194 In other words, this scholarship focuses on a data 
breach as functionally the cause of security “harm,”195 rather than 
merely a visible symptom of a deeper problem. In reality, a breach is 
merely one of many possible consequences of the real problem—the 
underlying security inadequacy in technical and corporate governance 
processes.196 Each of these framings falls prey to the privacy conflation 
error197 and misses the bigger picture, both in terms of computer 
science and law. 
a. Security!=198 privacy as a technical matter of computer science. 
Defining information security law solely in relation to privacy law 
yields incorrect analysis, both as a technical computer-science matter 
and as a normative policy matter. As a technical matter, privacy-
conflated analysis contradicts basics of the science of computer 
 
[security] precaution. Such overcompliance with the law risks inhibiting socially useful 
data  collection.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in 
the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 889 (2014) (“The third approach 
of U.S. privacy law is to list specific types of data that constitute personal information . . . . State 
data breach notification laws take this approach.”). 
 194. See infra notes 496–97 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Daniel Solove, Privacy and Data Security Harms, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 
4, 2014), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/08/privacy-and-data-security 
-harms.html. 
 196. For a discussion of possible consequences of security failures, see infra text 
accompanying notes 464–80. 
 197. One scholar has correctly argued that security is not the “handmaiden” of privacy. See 
Lauren Henry, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 107, 
107 (2015) (“Legal academic and policy discourse generally presumes that information privacy 
and data security are interchangeable goals. The conventional wisdom is that data security is a 
handmaiden of information privacy . . . .”). 
 198. != is commonly used in programming languages to express the idea “does not equal.” 
Equality Operators: == and !=, MICROSOFT, https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ 
c35t2ffz.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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security. Computer scientists draw a technical distinction between the 
study of “security”199 and the study of “privacy.”200 
Security, in the technical community, historically refers to 
questions of data confidentiality,201 integrity,202 and availability203 as 
engineering properties of a system204—questions likely to be 
disconnected from the identity of any individual human person.205 
 
 199. For example, a computer security curriculum in a computer science department might 
include courses such as Security Management: Systems Administration, Database Security, 
Computer Security Operating Systems, Systems Administration, Network Security Computer 
Networks, Formal Methods for Security Software Engineering, and Cryptography. See, e.g., Alec 
Yasinsac, Information Security Curricula in Computer Science Departments: Theory and 
Practice 6 (Nov. 2, 2002) (unpublished paper), http://www.cs.fsu.edu/~yasinsac/Papers 
/Yas01b.pdf. 
 200. Privacy curriculum in computer science might include courses focused on assisting 
students in obtaining skills such as designing products and services that leverage big data while 
preserving privacy, proposing and evaluating solutions regarding privacy risks, understanding 
how privacy-enhancing technologies can be used to reduce privacy risks, using techniques to 
aggregate and de-identify data, understanding the limits of de-identification, understanding 
current privacy regulatory and self-regulatory frameworks, conducting privacy-related risk 
assessments and compliance reviews, responding to incidents, integrating privacy into the 
software engineering lifecycle phases, and conducting basic usability evaluations of privacy-
related features and processes. See Privacy Engineering, CARNEGIE MELLON U., http:// 
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 201. Confidentiality has classically been defined as the maintenance of technical properties 
set a priori regarding a system’s limitations of data access. See Confidentiality [of data], in 
Glossary of Computer Security Acronyms, NIST.GOV, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ 
secpubs/rainbow/tg004.txt (“The concept of holding sensitive data in confidence, limited to 
an appropriate set of individuals or organizations.”) (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 202. Integrity has classically been defined as the preservation of data or a system properties 
set a priori, free from manipulation or impairment. See id. at system integrity, (“The quality that 
a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from 
deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system.”); id. at data integrity, 
(“The property that data meet an a priori expectation of quality.”); id. at integrity (“Sound, 
unimpaired or perfect condition.”). 
 203. Availability has classically referred to preservation of the technical property set a priori 
regarding the ability of a user to access data in the system. See id. at availability of data, (“The 
state when data are in the place needed by the user, at the time the user needs them, and in the 
form needed by the user.”). 
 204. Part of the privacy conflation error may arise because scholars and policymakers hear 
security discussions of “confidentiality” and erroneously believe them to somehow map to the 
privacy law concept of “confidentiality” as it appears in tort law among human litigants. It does 
not. For a discussion of the privacy tort concept of confidentiality, see, for example, Woodrow 
Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 763 (2014) (“This Article urges 
a revival of implied confidentiality by identifying from the relevant case law a set of implied 
confidentiality norms based upon party perception and inequality that courts should be, but are 
not, considering in online disputes.”). 
 205. See infra text accompanying notes 209–10. 
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Privacy, on the other hand, encompasses questions of anonymity, 
metadata, and traffic analysis206—questions that relate to identities of 
particular humans and their outputs.207 In other words, the unit of 
analysis can materially differ for questions of security and questions of 
privacy; they are orthogonal computer science fields that merely 
conceptually overlap in part. Imagine a Venn diagram with two 
circles—one security, one privacy—that overlap slightly in the middle. 
 
 
 206. See, e.g., Jelle van den Hooff, et al., Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to 
Traffic Analysis 137 (Oct. 4, 2015) (unpublished paper), https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers 
/vuvuzela:sosp15.pdf (“Private messaging over the Internet has proven challenging to 
implement, because even if message data is encrypted, it is difficult to hide metadata about who 
is communicating in the face of traffic analysis.”). 
 207. See infra text accompanying notes 210–13. 
Privacy
Can a particular human using the system 
be personally identified from e.g. traffic 
analysis or metadata analysis?
Security
Does the system (as implemented through 
harware, software, and humans) 
successfully defend against third party 
attacks on confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of code and information? 
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In summary, some technical conceptual overlap can be argued to 
exist in the broadest of terms between security questions and privacy 
questions because both implicate raw underlying data. However, the 
field of security is not defined in relation to privacy as a technical matter 
of computer science. Privacy-conflated “cyberized” legal scholarship is, 
therefore, definitionally at loggerheads with computer science. 
b. The legal and policy difference between security and privacy. As a 
legal and policy matter, it is both logical and useful to map policy and 
legal distinctions of security and privacy onto the existing computer 
science distinctions to the greatest extent possible.208 Indeed, as 
described in Part II, doing otherwise has previously resulted in 
decades of avoidable legal morass.209 Thus, rather than a privacy-
conflated view, this Article, instead, advocates a more rigorous 
definition for security. It advocates drawing as crisp a line between 
security and privacy as possible and mirroring the distinctions of 
computer science as closely as feasible. 
Let us start with a definition for security: 
Security refers to the hybrid scientific and legal inquiry into (1) 
whether particular implemented systems, products, and processes 
can successfully defend against all possible third-party attackers 
in both physical and digital space, and (2) what legal 
consequences arise when they cannot.  
As explained above, the technical field of information security 
investigates whether a system as implemented in hardware, software, 
and (by and in) humans can withstand a third-party attack and 
maintain the core properties of data confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Security inadequacies are, therefore, objectively-testable, 
replicable failures of technological and human measures to maintain 
the system’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The legal and 
policy analysis of security consequently asks whether the failure was 
foreseeable in light of the state of the art of scientific knowledge and 
standards of security care deemed necessary by the community of 
technical security experts. Information security law, in other words, 
creates legal duties and recourse for violations of objectively-testable 
 
 208. A scientifically-consonant legal and policy definition of security allows more effective 
and efficient interdisciplinary policy conversations with computer security experts– a desirable 
result. See discussion of epistemological humility infra Section III.C. 
 209. See supra Section II.B. 
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minimum standards of care in the creation, deployment, and 
operation of a system, as such standards are determined by the 
scientific community of computer security technical experts a priori. 
Now let us turn to privacy: 
Privacy refers to the legal and policy inquiry regarding conflicts 
between (1) what information a person reasonably expects210 will 
be or can be collected and used211 about her (based in part on the 
legally-binding promises made to her, whose enforceability arises 
from dictates of either criminal or civil law212), on the one hand, 
and (2) the technical and business reality of possible or actual 
collection and repurposing by the collector, on the other. 
Unlike security, which focuses on properties of systems, privacy 
analysis uses a particular person—not a technical system—as the focal 
point of analysis. Privacy relates to the negotiated rights and privileges 
of a (usually) human person in her own information and her choice to 
engage in its selective transmission under certain terms. Privacy law, 
therefore, creates legal recourse for violations of a person’s ability to 
prevent the collection or repurposed use of data by a particular collector 
in specific ways. In other words, privacy rights reflect a partially 
normative inquiry that is relationship-specific: they turn on subjective 
and objective social expectations of a particular person in  a  particular 
context—what the criminal law has called a “reasonable  expectation” 
and what Professor Helen Nissenbaum has called  “contextual.”213 
Consequently, the presence of a privacy violation is not objectively 
testable without knowing the terms of a consensual idiosyncratic 
agreement between parties, the nature of the information, and the 
 
 210. This expectation is constructed either subjectively or objectively depending on 
context and legal constraints in contract and other law. For a discussion of reasonable 
expectations in contract, see, for example, Matwyshyn, supra note 49, at 532 (proposing to ease 
doctrinal noise in consent through creating an objective “reasonable digital consumer” standard 
based on empirical testing of real consumers). 
 211. This use encompasses any additional information that can be derived from that 
information, either directly or through aggregation with information from other sources. 
 212. For a discussion of criminal and tort privacy, see, for example, Diane L. Zimmerman, 
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. 
REV. 291, 294 (1983) (encouraging a re-evaluation of the prevailing privacy doctrine). 
 213. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 119 
(2004) (“Contextual integrity ties adequate protection for privacy to norms of specific contexts, 
demanding that information gathering and dissemination be appropriate to that context and 
obey the governing norms of distribution within it.”). 
3.MATWYSHYN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018 10:45 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1142 
social context within which these promises exist. In this way, privacy 
contrasts sharply with security; security of a system is always objectively 
testable by third-parties on the four corners of the system, process, or 
product with no additional information. Regardless of what 
interpersonal or legal obligations may or may not exist, whether a 
system maintains confidentiality, integrity, and availability is a 
statement reflecting the state of the art of technical knowledge and 
the functioning of a particular system, as this system was built a priori 
and as it is operated and maintained. It is not a contextual analysis 
after the fact (like privacy).  
 
 
Privacy failure
When there's a disconnect between
- What a person expected about the extent of 
collected connectable information in possession of 
a particular party and its future uses and
- The true extent of collected connectable 
information and its uses by that party
Security failure
When a particular system, as implemented, 
does not successfully defend against all 
possible third party attacks against its 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability
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 In other words, information security policy and law relate to 
Alice’s legal duties arising from the (objectively testable) success or 
failure of her system in defending the confidentiality, availability, and 
integrity of its code and information against Eve, an attacker, who 
wants to read, manipulate, or steal the data. Privacy policy and law, 
meanwhile, relate to the idiosyncratic terms of the agreement214 where 
Bob allows Alice to collect and use certain information about him that 
he selectively discloses to her on certain terms. 
 
 
 214. For a discussion of privacy policies see, for example, Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1856 (2011) (“[S]tudies have shown that few consumers read privacy 
policies, and that those who do frequently fail to understand them.”). 
Privacy
1. What did Bob reasonably expect about Alice's 
information collection and intended uses (and 
what did she promise at the point of collection)?
2. What information did Alice actually collect 
and how did she use it? 
3. If not aligned, what remedy should Bob be 
afforded?
Security
1. Can Alice's system sucessfully defend 
against Eve's attack? 
2. If not, was the failure foreseeable? 
3. What are Alice's legal duties of 
mitigation/harm remediation to various 
parties, including Bob whose information 
was impacted?
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Let us briefly further elaborate on the separateness of security from 
privacy with an example. Recently, a security researcher stumbled 
across the control systems of multiple hydroelectric plants in France215 
and a steel mill216 that had been (dangerously) connected to the 
internet. Because of public accessibility, these connections potentially 
allowed for remote manipulation and disruption of operations.217 If a 
hydroelectric plant or a steel mill control system is accessible through 
the internet, its operators have made a grievous security error with 
respect to availability. If the control system code can also be 
manipulated or altered to modify its operation, its security also reflects 
an inadequacy with respect to integrity. If information about the 
control system structure and other sensitive content is disclosed to 
attackers as well, the security error also impacts confidentiality.218 As 
an information security policy matter, there is no logical argument in 
favor of implementing the code of hydroelectric plant or steel mill 
control systems in a vulnerable manner that may put human lives at 
risk.219 In this example, no privacy concerns exist and no human’s 
subjective privacy choices are implicated or implemented; leaving the 
control system of a hydroelectric plant vulnerable and connected to 
the internet is simply a dangerously irresponsible security blunder with 
national security implications. 
Thus, the privacy conflation error highlights an undesirable 
muddling of technical reality. It also means that lawmakers, 
technologists, companies, and consumers are likely to end up talking 
 
 215. Dartmouth, “It’s Fine,” They Said. “Just Ship It,” They Said., at 46:00, YOUTUBE 
(June 9, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBA6u5IsXycat (last visited Jan. 
12,  2018). 
 216. See id. at 9:05 (“Who thought this was a good idea?”). 
 217. A power plant in Italy was also recently available on Shodan, apparently suffering from 
a security vulnerability and granting access to remote attackers to an on/off switch. Dan Tentler 
(@Viss), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2016, 8:57 AM), https://twitter.com/Viss/status/719554936 
208363520. 
 218.  A vulnerable system may suffer from inadequacies of security with respect to any or 
all of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For a discussion of the distinction among these 
three properties, see supra notes 201–03. 
 219.  A similar argument might be made in connection with the vulnerability where four 
lines of code enabled the remote compromise of a Jeep in 2015, resulting in a journalist being 
driven into a ditch. See supra note 10; David Schneider, Jeep Hacking 101, IEEE SPECTRUM 
(Aug. 6, 2015, 5:44 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/systems 
/jeep-hacking-101 (discussing that there was no implementation “choice” to write vulnerable 
code, but that it was an uncaught error that may have resulted in thousands of deaths in the 
hands of attackers unless patched). 
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past each other. In this way, the privacy conflation error introduces us 
to our second flaw, the flaw of incommensurability. 
2. Seems cyberlegit:220 Incommensurability 
Cyber pathogens221 are so unspeakably dangerous that the 
open research community has wisely never published a 
single paper about them. 
—Professor Matt Blaze222 
 
Mastering security requires years of rigorous study. Consequently, 
lawyers have sometimes developed the coping strategy of simply 
making up vaguely technical-sounding “computer-y” terms223 or 
making flawed (quasi)technical assumptions224 or assertions,225 often 
 
 220. Seems Legit / Sounds Legit, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/ 
memes/seems-legit-sounds-legit (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 221. Jonathan Zdziarski, On Dormant Cyber Pathogens and Unicorns, ZDZIARSKI’S BLOG 
THINGS (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5849. 
 222. Matt Blaze (@mattblaze), TWITTER, (Mar. 3, 2016, 10:24 PM), https://twitter.
com/mattblaze/status/705640145056190464?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw. 
 223. HAL 90210, What’s a ‘Cyber Pathogen’? San Bernadino DA Baffles 
Security  Community, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2016, 5:52 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2016/mar/04/san-bernardino-da-baffles-security-community-lying-dormant-cyb 
er-pathogen-iphone. 
 224. For example, one scholar asserts (without citation) that “inefficiency creates 
resiliency.” Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 638 (2011). He argues 
that “a key goal for cybersecurity is increasing the inefficiency with which information is stored.” 
Id. at 640. Yet, computer scientists who study security will tell you that technology 
complexity/inefficiency is actually the enemy of security—it is how mistakes happen. See 
Deciphering the Debate over Encryption: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (Apr. 19, 2016) (statement of Matt Blaze, 
Professor, University of Pennsylvania), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/2016 
0419/104812/HHRG-114-IF02-Wstate-BlazeM-20160419-U3.pdf (“Adding key escrow 
renders even the specification of the protocol itself far more complex, making it virtually 
impossible to assure that any systems using it will actually have the security properties that these 
systems are intended to have.”). Instead, what this author perhaps meant to argue was that data 
storage redundancy has benefits for recovery in case of system failures. But, that is a prudent act 
of efficient risk management, not an “inefficiency.” 
 225. For example, one scholar recently provided an inaccurate understanding of the 
definition of “integrity” per computer science. See Bambauer, supra note 180, 798–99 (“Most 
broadly, [integrity] signals that the authorized user entered valid and reliable data.”). In 
computer science, integrity refers to the state where information and a system have been 
unaltered. It does not, however, generally concern the validity or reliability of the data as an 
independent construct before it entered the system. See supra note 202. Indeed, a computer 
science aphorism warns of this technical reality—“Garbage in, garbage out.” See Garbage in, 
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predicated on questionable physical space analogies.226 Although these 
coping strategies may seem harmless or desirable to the lawyers, legal 
academics, and policymakers using them, they are often 
problematically counterproductive for purposes of crafting optimal 
security policy. These “computer-y” legal terms often create 
avoidable  conflicts with rigorously-defined terms from computer 
science.  Indeed, this phenomenon generally leads to an 
incommensurability  problem: a situation in  which divergent 
baselines of understanding  create a counterproductive language 
barrier to meaningful  communication. 227 
a. Security lessons from section 1201 of the DMCA. 
Incommensurability challenges for security and law are not new. The 
case study of the history of section 1201 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act228 (DMCA) offers a cautionary tale of how lawyers’ 
faux-technical words end badly for security. The DMCA, a copyright 
statute with both criminal and civil penalties,229 was passed in 1998,230 
ostensibly as part of the U.S. embodiment of World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) obligations231 that intended to 
strengthen digital copyright against acts of circumvention.232 Under 
 
Garbage out (GIGO), TECHTARGET, http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/ 
garbage-in-garbage-out (last updated Mar. 2008). 
 226. See, e.g., Timothy A. Wiseman, Encryption, Forced Decryption, and the Constitution, 
11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 525, 552 (2015) (“One frequently used analogy is to say 
that encryption is like a safe, the data is like its contents, and the password is like the combination. 
This analogy, like all analogies, is not perfectly accurate.”). 
 227. As used here, the term incommensurability adopts the primitive dictionary definition– 
“lacking a basis of comparison in respect to a quality normally subject to comparison.” 
Incommensurable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inco 
mmensurable (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). The term “incommensurability” has also been used by 
several philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn, who argued that conceptual 
incommensurability is manifest in different structures and methodologies used in laws and 
theories, leading to upheaval of paradigms. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF  SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). However, Kuhn’s analysis and definitions of 
“incommensurability” questions are contested in the philosophy of science, and this article does 
not wade into this philosophical conflict. 
 228.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 229.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 545–46 
(1999) (“[T]here are serious criminal penalties for willfully violating section 1201.”). 
 230.  17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 231.  See Samuelson, supra note 229, at 521. 
 232.  Id. 
3.MATWYSHYN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018 10:45 AM 
1109 CYBER! 
 1147 
the DMCA, the act of circumvention of a “technological measure” 
itself became a violation of copyright law, even without any further 
copying.233 Congress built in a few statutory exceptions by design, 
including an exception for “encryption research.” But Congress also 
presciently anticipated that digital copyright circumstances might 
change across time, and it wisely built in a feedback loop—a process 
for new exemptions to section 1201’s anti-circumvention provisions 
that would be granted by the Librarian of Congress234 in consultation 
with the Register of Copyrights.235 Despite incorporating this 
feedback  loop, however, Congress failed to anticipate a serious 
incommensurability problem in one of the DMCA’s key legal terms: 
“technological measure.”236 
While the term “technological measure” may sound self-evident 
to a legal ear, the term is neither self-evident237 nor technical to the 
ears of computer scientists.238 Because of Congress’s use of this 
pseudo-technical legal term in the DMCA,239 computer security 
 
 233.  For a discussion of the impact of the DMCA, see, for example, Stefan Bechtold, 
Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004); 
Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Content: Moving Forward 
Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 39 (2006); 
Gwen Hinze, Brave New World, Ten Years Later: Reviewing the Impact of Policy Choices in the 
Implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ Technological Protection Measure Provisions, 57 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 779 (2007); Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and 
Policy, 82 OR. L. REV. 695 (2003); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2002–2003); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000); David Nimmer, Appreciating 
Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
909 (2002); Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse 
Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted 
Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007). 
 234.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C); 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  For example, noted computer scientists have pointed to cases of the absence of an 
extraction interface as one type of technology circumstance that creates ambiguity regarding 
whether a technological protection measure exists. See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN ET AL., LONG 
COMMENT REGARDING A PROPOSED EXEMPTION UNDER 17 U.S.C. 1201, http://copyright. 
gov/1201/2015/comments-020615/InitialComments_LongForm_SecurityResearchers_Clas 
s25.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 238.  Id. (filing by proponents of the (granted) security research exemption to section 1201 
of the DMCA explaining why the pre-exemption DMCA framework chilled security research 
and enabled frivolous litigation). 
 239.  Id. 
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researchers (and their counsel) struggled for the next fifteen years to 
interpret the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions.240 Additionally, 
just as Professor Jacqui Lipton has warned of the potential for the 
DMCA to be used to quash competition,241 the DMCA’s ambiguities 
were sometimes used by civil litigants to quash unflattering security 
research.242 Wielding section 1201’s faux-technical language as a 
sword, litigious companies began to threaten security researchers in 
an attempt to avoid discourse about security and particular products’ 
security failures.243 In this way, critical security research was materially 
chilled244 because of the fear of accidentally running afoul of the 
DMCA.245 Finally, in 2015, the Copyright Office and Librarian of 
Congress acknowledged and partially corrected this problematic state 
of affairs by granting246 the exemption247 request248 of a group of 
computer security academics249 represented by this author,250 
determining that a circumvention of any technological protection 
measures in the course of most251 security research falls outside the 
conduct deemed verboten by the DMCA.252 
 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005) (citing the DMCA’s 
potential “to be used to quash commercial competition . . . where a copyright work . . . is a 
purely incidental facet of [a] product”). 
 242.  See BELLOVIN, supra note 237. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  According to leading computer security academics, because of this DMCA 
incommensurability problem and the looming threat of possible legal sanction, computer 
security researchers were often able to analyze less than forty percent of the code they had hoped 
to research in particular projects. See id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65944, 65955–56 (2015) (codified 37 CFR 
pt.  201). 
 247.  Id. at 65950–51. 
 248.  Our original requested exemption covered a broader swath of research activity, But, 
the grant reflected a substantial piece of our original request, focusing on consumer-purchased 
goods. Id. 
 249.  See BELLOVIN, supra note 237. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Kicks Off “Start with Security” Business 
Education Initiative (June 30, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
2015/06/ftc-kicks-start-security-business-education-initiative. 
 252.  Id. 
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Two key lessons are visible in this case study of the DMCA’s 
incommensurability problem. The first is the danger of analyzing 
security questions in legal silos. While trying to protect the security of 
a particular part of our system—copyrighted digital works—the 
DMCA’s faux-technical language inadvertently harmed the security of 
our system as a whole.253 It chilled academic and private sector research 
because of its incommensurate terminology.254 The second lesson 
relates to the importance of legal feedback loops to enable correction 
of legal errors. Although the DMCA’s exemption process is far from 
ideal,255 the DMCA incommensurability problem was partially 
remedied solely because of the existence of a feedback loop256 open to 
the private sector and built in by statutory design.257 
b. The current state of “cyberized” incommensurability. Much like 
the struggles of interpreting the meaning of “technological measures” 
under the DMCA, “cybersecurity” is a term that means different 
things to different people.258 Indeed, “cyberized” information security 
legal discourse makes the incommensurability problems of security 
worse. It exacerbates communication difficulty and social distance259 
 
 253.  See BELLOVIN supra note 237, at 4. 
 254.  See supra note 227. For a legal discussion of incommensurability, see, for example, 
Brian Leiter, Incommensurability: Truth or Consequences?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1727 (1998) 
(“[T]he thesis that values are incommensurable appeals to our ordinary ways of thinking and 
talking about values, but not necessarily to our actual behavior.”). But see Frederick Schauer, 
Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1998) (“[T]hose who argue 
for incommensurability or incomparability deny the phenomenon of commensurability or 
comparability, and thus maintain that the members of some pairs or sets of reasons, values, 
options, or norms are irreducibly different.”). 
 255.  For a critique of the DMCA, see Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
349, 350 (2008). 
 256.  For a discussion of the value of feedback loops in design, see generally NORBERT 
WIENER, CYBERNETICS: OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE 
MACHINE (2d ed. 1965) (arguing that feedback loops play an essential role in systems 
functioning properly). 
 257.  See, e.g., Menell, supra note 233, at 155. 
 258.  See Orin Kerr, What is ‘Cybersecurity Law’?, WASH. POST (May 14, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/14/what-is-cybe 
rsecurity-law/?utm_term=.a5628328338f. 
 259.  For a discussion of social distance, see Jacqueline B. Helfgott & Elaine Gunnison, 
The Influence of Social Distance on Community Corrections Officer Perceptions of Offender Reentry 
Needs, 72 FED. PROBATION 2, 3–4 (2008) (“‘Social distance’ has been defined in the research 
literature as the level of trust one group has for another . . . and the degree of perceived similarity 
of beliefs between a perceiver and target.”). 
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between the language of technical information security experts on the 
one hand, and legislators, policymakers and legal practitioners on the 
other. Professor Orin Kerr has correctly observed that “cybersecurity” 
even means different things to different lawyers in various law firms.260 
But, perhaps surprisingly, the term “cybersecurity” also exacerbates 
incommensurability problems across government policymakers and 
various federal agencies. The term “cybersecurity” and even the 
concept of “good” security currently mean different things to 
different governmental organizations. As Professor Julie Cohen has 
argued, scholars have also often preferred to debate particular security 
measures “rather than to delve too deeply into the ways 
in  which  public discourse invests that term with particular, 
contingent  meanings.”261 
To wit, due to this incommensurability problem, federal agencies 
tasked with enforcing some aspect of information security are 
beginning to function at cross-purposes with each other, despite 
ostensibly sharing a goal of improving security. In interpreting their 
mission in light of security, they diverge in the paradigms they apply 
to the problem. For example, perhaps the most starkly perceived 
difference in posture currently exists between the two agencies that 
are perhaps most active in security enforcement, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).262 
In furtherance of its dual mission to encourage fair competition 
and enhance consumer protection,263 the FTC has adopted a socially-
 
 260.  Kerr offers a four-part division of what he states is being called a new field of 
“cybersecurity” law. According to Professor Kerr, this emerging field spans (1) the law governing 
steps that potential or actual victims of Internet intrusions can take in response to potential or 
actual intrusions; (2) the law governing liability for computer intrusions, both for the perpetrator 
and the victim; (3) the regulatory law of computer security; and (4) special issues raised by 
government network offense and defense. See Kerr, supra note 175. 
 261.  COHEN, supra note 130, at 185. 
 262.  ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT HAMPERS 
SECURITY RESEARCH, https://www.eff.org/document/cfaa-and-security-researchers (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018); Jerry Markon, Computer Hacker Andrew Auernheimer’s Conviction is 
Overturned by Appeals Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washington 
post.com/politics/computer-hacker-andrew-auernheimers-conviction-is-overturned-by-appeal 
s-court/2014/04/11/0744a3bc-c1bc-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html. But see Aaron 
Boyd, More from Black Hat: DOJ Official Draws Line Between Cyber Crime, Legitimate Research, 
FED. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.federaltimes.com/2015/08/05/more-from-black-
hat-doj-official-draws-line-between-cyber-crime-legitimate-research//. 
 263.  About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
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porous,264 holistic265 stance on what it calls “data security”266—not 
“cybersecurity.” The FTC both proactively issues security guidance267 
and engages in enforcement activity. 268 Perhaps most importantly, the 
FTC has embraced the importance of feedback loops and formally 
sought out technical expertise in security from the private sector in 
order to inform its work. These proactive steps have included the 
creation of a Chief Technologist269 and a Senior Policy 
Advisor/Scholar in Residence program,270 organizing271 and 
participating in technical information security conferences,272 
community outreach events,273 and security contests under the 
America Competes Act in collaboration with the private sector security 
research community.274 In lieu of adopting an information sharing or 
deterrence-focused paradigm,275 the FTC instead has advocated an 
 
 264.  The FTC maintains feedback loops with the private sector in multiple ways, including 
through an outside chief technologist and academic in-residence program. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Names Latanya Sweeney as Chief Technologist; Andrea 
Matwyshyn as Policy Advisor (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/11/ftc-names-latanya-sweeney-chief-technologist-andrea-matwyshyn. 
 265.  The FTC considers the totality of reasonable security measures —both online and 
offline—in its analysis. FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY (2015), https://www.ftc. 
gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  The FTC advocates for organizations to “Start with Security” in the name of 
consumer protection and protection of their own intangible assets. Id. 
 268.  The FTC has completed over 50 enforcement actions to date. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/syst 
em/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_ 
2014.pdf. 
 269.  See, e.g., Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-
coppa-frequently-asked-questions. 
 270.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 268. 
 271.  See PrivacyCon: Call for Presentations, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
privacycon-call-for-presentations (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 272.  See DEF CON 23 Speakers, DEF CON, https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-
23/dc-23-speakers.html#McSweeny (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (McSweeny speaking at 
Def  Con 23). 
 273. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 251. 
 274. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Internet of Things Challenge to 
Combat Security Vulnerabilities in Home Devices (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-announces-internet-things-challenge-combat-security. 
 275. See Terrell McSweeny, Security is a Must for the Internet of Things, RECODE (Jan. 27, 
2015, 6:26 AM), http://www.recode.net/2015/1/27/11558088/security-is-a-must-for-the-
internet-of-things. 
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approach focused on security by design.276 In particular, FTC 
Commissioners have also advocated the use of encryption by 
companies and consumers as a successful tool to protect themselves 
against identity theft, trade secret theft, and other data harms.277 In 
short, it can be said that the FTC has adopted a decentralized 
approach to its security mission akin to what I have elsewhere called a 
“security through process” model278 with multiple private sector 
feedback loops. 
In contrast to the FTC and in line with its different overall 
mission, DOJ has adopted a more cloistered, reactive approach that 
reflects a primary focus on deterrence of attackers as a focal point of 
its approach to “cybersecurity.” DOJ engaged in over 200 
prosecutions of criminal computer intrusion offenses in 2016,279 
supported proposals to eliminate all misdemeanor offenses for 
computer intrusion, and advocated increased sentences.280 DOJ does 
not currently appear to have an extensive set of formal feedback 
loops281 with the private sector to update attorneys’ knowledge of 
security.282 Meanwhile, because DOJ enforces, among other 
 
 276. The FTC has encouraged all businesses to “Start with Security” in their internal and 
external operations, and the FTC’s guidance nudges organizations to build reasonable security 
into their products and services by design. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265. 
 277. Terrell McSweeny (@TMcSweenyFTC), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/tmcsweenyftc/status/684474547131826177. 
 278. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate 
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 135 (2005) 
(“Known in information security and cryptography theory as ‘security through obscurity,’ this 
paradigm is considered inferior to a security paradigm predicated on Kerckhoff’s Law, or 
‘security through process.’”). 
 279. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016), https://oig.justice.gov
/reports/2016/a1703.pdf. 
 280. Orin Kerr, Obama’s Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute: A Deep Dive, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ 
wp/2015/01/14/obamas-proposed-changes-to-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deep-dive/? 
utm_term=.bdf219365cc4 (“Instead of the current approach, which starts with a misdemeanor 
and becomes a 5-year-max felony if one of the enhancements applies, the Administration 
proposes that liability should start as a 3-year felony and become a 10-year-max felony if one of 
the enhancements applies.”). 
 281. However, it is noteworthy that individual attorneys in DOJ attend and speak at 
security conferences and have relationships in the security research community. See, e.g., Speaker: 
Leonard Bailey, BLACK HAT, https://www.blackhat.com/us-15/speakers/Leonard-Bailey.html 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 282. For example, based on its website, DOJ does not appear to currently organize 
conferences at main Justice with external security researchers for the benefit of its attorneys, nor 
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information security statutes, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA)—a statute currently suffering from contentious circuit 
splits283—the deficit of formal feedback loops heightens the private 
sector’s feeling of uncertainty regarding prosecutorial discretion284 and 
interpretations of the law.285 Lawyers counsel clients that much gray 
area exists, and historic indictments are not always freely available for 
review.286 DOJ rarely issues enforcement guidance, with an exception 
occurring in the area of security information and antitrust 
enforcement.287 Perhaps most notably, the positions of the FTC 
and  DOJ on the desirability288 of basic defensive technical 
 
does it appear to have a Scholar in Residence program similar to that of the FTC. Although DOJ 
hosts training sessions for its attorneys and investigators in digital forensics at its conference 
center in South Carolina, budgetary constraints and time pressure undoubtedly limit the number 
of attorneys who can actually attend these sessions. See Course Offerings: FY 2018, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https:// www.justic e.gov/usao/training/course-offerings/schedule-2017 (last 
updated Sep. 21, 2017). 
 283. For a discussion of circuit splits in the CFAA, see, for example, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, 
The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 159 (2013) (“Applying the restrained 
technology exceptionalist paradigm to the case study of the CFAA-contract law circuit 
split . . . .”); Jones Walker LLP, “Cannibal Cop” Decision Deepens Circuit Split On Federal 
Hacking Statute, TRADE SECRET INSIDER (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.tradesecretsinsider. 
com/cannibal-cop-decision-deepens-circuit-split-on-federal-hacking-statute/. 
 284. See, e.g., Jamie Williams, New Federal Guidelines for Computer Crime Law Do Nothing 
to Reign in Prosecutorial Overreach Under Notoriously Vague Statue, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/10/what-were-scared-about-
halloween-prosecutorial-discretion-under-notoriously-vague. 
 285. Id. 
 286. The primary free method available to the public, apart from a Google query or the 
limited number of Pacer terminals available in libraries, requires searching through press releases 
on DOJ website. These press releases may not reflect all indictments or link to them. See Justice 
News, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/news (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). By contrast, 
the SEC and CFPB website offer more robust searching capability. See Division of Enforcement, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, https://www.sec. gov/enforce (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); 
Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance
.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 287. For example, in 2014, DOJ and the FTC, the two agencies most active in antitrust 
law matters, signed a memorandum of cooperation regarding the permissibility of corporate 
information security information sharing under antitrust law. See DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N: ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT ON SHARING OF CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION 
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/04/10/305027.pdf; 
see also DEP’T OF JUST., A FRAMEWORK FOR A VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM FOR 
ONLINE SYSTEMS, VERSION 1.0 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/
file/983996/download.  
 288. The Pentagon also supports use of encryption. See Pentagon Invites Hackers in and 
Backs Encryption, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
35706988; Spencer Ackerman & Danny Yadron, US Defense Chief Tells Silicon Valley: 
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security  measures such as encryption289 appear to the public to 
fundamentally  conflict. 
When baselines of understanding and approach are unintent-
ionally balkanized in this manner, meaningful policy progress is 
hampered. Well-intentioned experts from both sides begin to talk past 
each other and can miss the bigger picture. This brings us to our third 
flaw: internet exceptionalism. 
3. Honeybadger don’t cyber:290 Internet exceptionalism 
Number of cybers in POTUS cybersecurity cyberspeech: 
twenty-seven. 
—Professor Ed Felten291 
 
The term “cybersecurity” itself is a bug and not a feature of the 
security conversation. On any given day, Twitter is full of technical 
experts engaging in dark humor,292 pointing out undesirable internet 
exceptionalism—what this Article calls the “cyberization”293 of 
information security policy by lawyers and policymakers. Security 
experts fear that in lieu of rigorously addressing the formidable 
security challenges our nation faces, our legal and policy discussions 
have instead devolved into a self-referential, technically inaccurate, and 
destructively amorphous “cyber-speak,”294 a legalistic mutant called 
 
‘Encryption is Essential’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2016/mar/02/apple-fbi-fight-silicon-valley-ashton-carter. 
 289.  For a discussion of the encryption law enforcement debate, see Stephanie K. Pell, 
You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What It Needs in A Post-
CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599 (2016). 
 290. Honey Badger, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/honey-
badger (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 291. Ed Felten (@EdFelten), TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2015, 1:37 PM), https://twitter 
.com/EdFelten/status/566350488820789248. 
 292. A Twitter account, @cybercyber, has also emerged mocking the over usage of cyber. 
See Danny Yadron & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, This Article Was Written with the Help of a 
‘Cyber’ Machine, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 4, 2015, 11:11 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/is-
the-prefix-cyber-overused-1425427767. 
 293. The overuse of the prefix “cyber” regularly triggers snide commentary from 
prominent security professionals. See, e.g., SwiftonSecurity (@SwiftonSecurity), TWITTER (Feb. 
21, 2016, 6:50 PM), https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/701599848772927488. 
 294. As explained recently by The Wall Street Journal, “[c]onscientious objectors like Mr. 
Stamos say cyber-buzzwords are short-circuiting a debate on an important issue, amid recent 
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“cybersecurity.”295 In other words, they worry that instead of valuing 
genuine technical expertise in security, the legal and policy audience 
erroneously believes that an accurate measure of expertise in security 
is determined by how many times a speaker can gratuitously attach296 
the prefix “cyber” to various words in a sentence,297 sounding to a 
security-trained ear much like someone suffering from an unfortunate 
linguistic tick. 
Superficially, this language discussion regarding the gratuitous 
attachment of the prefix298 “cyber” may seem to be merely the 
pedantic quibbling of veteran security experts. However, this 
“cyberization” problem is, in fact, significant for legal and policy 
reasons. Internet exceptionalist language implicitly neglects the 
physical aspects of security and unnecessarily injects damaging 
definitional imprecision into an already-complex security 
conversation. 
a. Put a cyber on it:299 Technical reality and cyberimprecision. 
 
[Cyber] means  nothing. 
—Michael McNerney300 
 
Information security often involves nothing particularly “cyber.” 
A recent episode of the television series Mr. Robot301 illustrates this 
 
large-scale computer breaches at Anthem Inc., Target Corp., Sony Pictures Entertainment and 
others.” See Yadron & Valentino-DeVries, supra note 292. 
 295. See Joseph Blankenship, Cybersecurity or Cyber Anything Usage, NTT SECURITY: 
CYBERSECURITY USAGE BLOG (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.solutionary.com/resource-
center/blog/2013/10/cybersecurity-usage/; Yadron & Valentino-Devries, supra note 292. 
 296. Indeed, cyber is a popular buzzword bingo term: As explained by the WSJ, Yahoo!’s 
(then) CISO, “Mr. Stamos quipped on Twitter that he had won ‘CyberBingo’ at his table after 
a conference speaker warned of a ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor.’” Yadron & Valentino-Devries, supra 
note 292. 
 297.  @allanfriedman, TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:54 AM), https://twitter.com
/allanfriedman/status/930841552024428545 
 298.  See Sarah Laughton, The History of the Prefix “-Cyber”, GATEWAY TO THE 
LAUGHTON’S (2003), http://www.laughton.com/cougar/writing/cyber.htm. 
 299.  Put a Bird on It, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/put-a-
bird-on-it (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 300. Former “cyber policy adviser” for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Yadron & 
Valentino-Devries, supra note 292. 
 301. Mr. Robot (USA television broadcast). Mr. Robot has fast acquired a loyal following 
among information security professionals and industry outsiders alike. See, e.g., Abigail Tracy, 
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reality.302 The main character, an information security professional and 
“hacktivist”303 named Elliot plots a large-scale attack on a 
multinational corporation.304 While the attack is to be carried out 
remotely through the internet, perhaps the most critical component 
of the attack involves physical security—it requires gaining physical 
access to a server farm in order to plant a device in an improperly-
installed305 network of thermostats.306 In this way, a server farm that 
went to extremes in implementing internet security measures307 is, 
nevertheless, undermined in its overall information security308 through 
a series of human errors in physical space.309 
As the compromise described above illustrates, there may be 
nothing “cyber” about the key step in an information security 
compromise. Yet, using the term “cybersecurity” seems to imply that 
information security issues are limited to code connected to the 
internet. As a technical matter, good information security is never 
solely “cyber”—physical security of machines and human 
manipulability through social engineering are always key aspects of 
information security in both the private and public sector. For 
 
‘Mr. Robot’s’ Cyber Crime Expert Talks Accuracy, Hacking Misconceptions and What Other Shows 
Get Wrong, FORBES (July 8, 2015, 8:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigail 
tracy/2015/07/08/mr-robots-cyber-crime-expert-talks-accuracy-hacking-misconceptions-and 
-what-other-shows-get-wrong/; Kim Zetter, Mr. Robot Is the Best Hacking Show Yet – But It’s 
Not Perfect, WIRED (July 8, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/mr-robot-
fact-check/. 
 302. Mr. Robot is much lauded for the relative accuracy of its code breaking and 
fictionalized intrusion sequences. The major caveat to the accuracy of the show entails the timing 
of the depicted intrusions. Breaking code usually entails significantly longer periods of attack 
than the show can depict without boring a large portion of its audience. See, e.g., Tracy, supra 
note 301; Zetter, supra note 301. 
 303. For a discussion of hacktivism, see, for example, GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, 
HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY (2014). 
 304. See generally Mr. Robot (USA television broadcast).  
 305. The thermostats in question were apparently all connected to a single network and 
compromising one allowed access to all the thermostats in the building. See Tim Surette, Mr. 
Robot “Exploits” Review, TV.COM (July 23, 2015), http://www.tv.com/shows/mr-
robot/community/post/mr-robot-season-1-episode-5-exploits-review-143758904580/. 
 306. MR. ROBOT: eps1.3_da3m0ns.mp4 & eps1.4_3xpl0its.wmv, (USA Network broad-
casts July 15, 2015 & July 22, 2015). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Abigail Tracy, Humans as Exploits: ‘Mr. Robot’ Episode 5 Reality Check, FORBES 
(July 22, 2015, 11:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/07/22/ 
humans-as-exploits-mr-robot-episode-5-reality-check/. 
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example, there was nothing particularly “cyber” about Private 
Manning’s inserting a physical compact disc310 or Edward Snowden’s 
using a thumb drive311 to copy sensitive government information,312 
nor was it an exclusively “cyber” problem that HVAC contractor 
employees’ conduct compromised Target’s point of sale terminals.313 
The Target contractor in question provided heating and cooling 
services solely in physical space.314 When an attacker socially 
engineers315 a receptionist on the phone into issuing new credentials 
for a network or when an attacker dumpster dives316 through a 
company’s improperly-shredded financials and proprietary 
information to repurpose them as part of an attack, these attacks are 
not primarily internet-driven. The dispositive information 
compromise often happens in physical space. As I have explained in my 
prior scholarship,317 information security refers to the totality318 of 
physical space and internet-enabled information control practices that 
a corporate or governmental organization maintains in a holistic 
manner.319 Thus, not only is the “cybering” of security technically 
 
 310. See Jared Newman, Fearing More Wikileaks, Military Bans DVDs, Thumb Drives, 
PCWORLD (Dec. 10, 2010, 9:39 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/213226/Fearing 
_More_Wikileaks_Military_Bans_DVDs_Thumb_Drives.html. 
 311. See Shaun Waterman, NSA Leaker Ed Snowden Used Banned Thumb-Drive, Exceeded 
Access, WASH. TIMES (June 14, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/ 
14/nsa-leaker-ed-snowden-used-banned-thumb-drive-exce/?page=all; see also David Leigh, 
How 250,000 US Embassy Cables Were Leaked, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2010, 1:14 PM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/how-us-embassy-cables-leaked. 
 312. Waterman, supra note 311. 
 313. See Thor Olavsrud, 11 Steps Attackers Took to Crack Target, CIO (Sept. 2, 
2014,  4:45  AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2600345/security0/11-steps-attackers-took-
to-crack-target.html. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Jared Kee, Social Engineering: Manipulating the Source (Apr. 28, 2008) (unpublished 
paper), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/engineering/social-engineering-m 
anipulating-the-source-32914. 
 316.  Id. 
 317. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First 
Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 817 n.99 (2013). 
 318. Id. (“Information security is not solely an Internet phenomenon. Information security 
questions involve both computer security and physical security. They must be analyzed as a 
holistic enterprise relating to the systemic assessment of information risk throughout the life 
cycle of a piece of information—from the creation of a bit of information to its destruction.”). 
 319. RICHARD KISSEL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY 
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE (2008), http://nvlpubs. 
nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-64r2.pdf. 
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incorrect320 in its description of attack surface, but it is also likely to 
cause legal confusion and failed policy outcomes. In light of this 
technical reality, we might next ask from whence did all this legal 
cybering arrive? 
b. The Knights Who Say Cyber: The cyber origin story. 
 
We are the Knights who say . . . NI. . . . We are the keepers 
of the sacred word. 
—Knight 1321 
 
We are no longer the knights who say Ni! We are now the 
knights who say ekki-ekki-ekki-ptang-zoom-boing! 
—Knight 1 (later)322 
 
Silicon Valley veterans regularly query, with a degree of 
befuddlement, why the term “cybersecurity” dominates policy 
discourse in Washington, D.C. around information security, when it 
is not the preferred term of art in Silicon Valley.323 In essence, the term 
“cybersecurity” is the consequence of a cultural divide between the 
two coasts: “cybersecurity” is the Washington, D.C. legal rebranding 
for what Silicon Valley veterans have historically usually called 
“infosec” or simply “security.”324 The origin story of the term 
“cybersecurity”325 varies a bit depending on source, but it is generally 
believed to be a  combination of 1980’s science fiction terminology326 
 
 320. Matwyshyn, supra note 317 (“Referring to all of information security, particularly in 
private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incorrect.”). 
 321.  MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 1975). 
 322.  Id. 
 323. Yadron & Valentino-DeVries, supra note 292. 
 324. See id.; One data at a time (@curtispokrant), TWITTER (June 25, 2015, 12:32 
AM),  https://twitter.com/curtispokrant/status/613973046420901889; Michail S., Closing 
Plenary: Information Security Programs in Academia [ShmooCon 2016], YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rn0BdODPSbA (video of a panel discussion of 
academics at ShmooCon, an annual security conference). 
 325.  Annalee Newitz, The Bizarre Evolution of the Word “Cyber”, IO9 (Sept. 16, 
2013,  3:00 PM), http://io9.com/today-cyber-means-war-but-back-in-the-1990s-it-mean-
1325671487. 
 326.  See generally WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984). 
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and military- speak.327 The prefix “cyber”328 derives from the work of 
William  Gibson,329 the science fiction author who coined the term 
“cyberspace.”330 In the 1990s, members of the military began to speak 
of “the cyberspace domain”331—a hypothetical separate battlefield332 
that is distinct from and often perceived to be compartmentalized333 
away from terrestrial space.334 Thus, when members of the military 
speak of security on this hypothetical battlefield, they speak of security 
“of the cyber domain” or “cyber security.”335  This military parlance 
then likely crept into DC policy conversations more generally.336 
However, I will also posit a second contributing origin story—a 
uniquely legal one that might be termed the “cyberlaw legacy 
problem.” Many policymakers are attorneys, and very few attorneys 
have received any formal legal education in information security law.337 
At best, assuming that attorneys graduated after 2000, the one 
 
 327.  See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, NO. 3-38 CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES, in ARMY 
FIELD MANUALS (2014), http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf. 
 328.  The prefix cyber- comes from the word cybernetic, arising “from the Greek word 
kubernētēs (κυβερνᾶν), ‘steersman’, from kubernan ‘to steer’”. Taylor Coe, Where is the Origin 
of ‘Cyber’?, OXFORD DICTIONARIES: BLOG (Mar. 5, 2015), http://blog.oxforddictionaries. 
com/2015/03/cyborgs-cyberspace-csi-cyber/. 
 329.  Gibson recently expressed his concerns regarding the rampant overuse and datedness 
of the “vintage” prefix “cyber.” See Yadron and Valentino-DeVries, supra note 292. Gibson 
stated, “[c]yberspace is a heritage term for a heritage concept . . . We [now] drive cybercars, chill 
our food in cyberfridges, conduct the majority of our affairs over cyberphones, in, literally, a 
cyberworld.” Id. 
 330.  See generally GIBSON, supra note 326. 
 331.  See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 327. 
 332.  See id. 
 333.  For instance, the Army Field Manual No. 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities 
describes “cyberspace” as being distinct from the other “domains” as follows: “The four 
traditional domains (air, land, maritime, and space) and the EMS exist naturally. The fifth 
domain, cyberspace, is manmade.” Id. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.  See, e.g., Introduction to the Cyber Domain, US NAVAL ACADEMY, https://www. 
usna.edu/CyberDept/sy110/lec/crsIntro/lec.html. 
 336.  Despite coining the term “cyber domain,” the military has recently begun to worry 
about what one officer termed the “dolphin speak” of its cyber branch members. See Sydney J. 
Freedberg Jr., Army Fights Culture Gap Between Cyber & Ops: ‘Dolphin Speak’, BREAKING 
DEFENSE (Nov. 10, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/army-fights-
culture-gap-between-cyber-ops-dolphin-speak/. Efforts are underway to better incorporate 
these soldiers into physical operations to eliminate a siloed approach to security. See id. Thus, the 
military is arguably shifting away from an internet exceptionalist paradigm. 
 337.  Indeed, even most technology professionals have received little or no training in 
information security. Michail S, supra note 324. 
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technology class they may have taken in law school was an internet law 
overview class often entitled “Cyberlaw.”338 While the vernacular of 
technology experts was already moving away from using the term 
“cyber” in the early 2000s,339 most attorneys were just beginning to 
become comfortable with (using search engines and) the term 
“cyberspace.”340 Indeed, a debate raged in the legal scholarship (and 
in law school classrooms) at the time regarding whether the internet 
was a separate space,341 an extension of physical space,342 or a hybrid 
thereof.343 Thus, when later faced with this “new” set of legal problems 
partially involving computers and security, many lawyers’ instinct 
would have likely been toward internet exceptionalism—to fixate on 
the presence of an internet aspect to information security. Harkening 
back to “cyberlaw” class, it would have seemed logical to them to 
append a “cyber”344 to the front of security and attempt to 
conceptually compartmentalize it for themselves as a subfield of 
 
 338.  The earliest information security law courses in law schools were taught circa 2006–
07. See, e.g., Faculty Course Evaluations, U. FLA., https://evaluations.ufl.edu/results/instruct 
or.aspx?ik=-131504421 (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 339.  See Newitz, supra note 325. 
 340.  For example, Professor Lawrence Lessig’s seminal internet law book Code and Other 
Laws of Cyberspace was published in 1999. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999). 
 341.  For a discussion of the debate, see generally Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom or Perfect 
Control?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 606, 618–20 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1199–1200 (1998); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and 
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Andrew L. Shapiro, The 
Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 709 (1998).  
 342.  Compare, Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207 (1996), with Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
 343.  For a discussion of the hybrid nature of the internet, see, for example, Matwyshyn, 
supra note 283, at 155 (introducing a paradigm of “restrained technology exceptionalism”). 
 344.  A humorous language problem has now emerged for these “cyberized” security 
attorneys as DC policy-speak mutated and began to drop the “security” in “cybersecurity,” 
leaving only a “cyber.” These “cybersecurity” attorneys are now in the awkward position of 
saying they practice “cyber law” and needing to explain that they don’t mean “cyberlaw” (i.e. 
internet law) but rather they mean “cyber law” (i.e. the policy area formerly known as 
“cybersecurity”) or “cyber cyberlaw.” This evolution likely resulted from the definitional deficit 
described above—the failure to consider physical security as key to information security. 
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“cyberlaw.”345 Legal academics have also, unfortunately, widely346 
embraced this “cyberized” information security legal discourse.347 Yet, 
as the prior sections have explained, framing our national security and 
economic security questions in an internet exceptionalist way likely 
exacerbates the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability rather than 
remedying it. 
Having identified these three analytical flaws of privacy-conflation, 
incommensurability, and internet exceptionalism, let us now begin to 
reframe the security conversation in more constructive directions in 
Part III. 
III. I SEE WHAT YOU CYBERED THERE:348  
KLUDGING TOGETHER A ROBUST SECURITY PARADIGM 
Once you’ve accepted your flaws, no one can use them 
against you. 
—Tyrion Lannister349 
 
The future of information security, though superficially bleak, is 
not beyond improvement. With the technical realities introduced in 
Part II in mind, Part III begins to address the problem of reciprocal 
security vulnerability. This Part borrows themes from the work of 
noted philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, the famous cognitive 
exercise of the Monty Hall problem, and the First Amendment theory 
construct of epistemological humility. It theoretically sets the stage for 
 
 345.  Also, calling the policy space “cyber” but the legal space “cyberlaw” will confuse the 
listener as to whether the speaker is using the antiquated name for internet law or referring to 
information security law. 
 346.  This author eschews the word “cyber” except in jest or in reference to other people’s 
branding. She refers to the field as information security law, data security, or simply security. See, 
e.g., Andrea Matwyshyn (@amatwyshyn), TWITTER (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:28 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/amatwyshyn/status/557650958583599104. I also may or may not have been 
instrumental in bestowing the name CYBER! on a neighborhood weasel. See Andrea Matwyshyn 
(@amatwyshyn), TWITTER (May 10, 2015, 4:21 PM), https://twitter.com/amatwyshyn/ 
status/597541926192185344; Andrea Matwyshyn (@amatwyshyn), TWITTER (May 16, 2015, 
9:25 AM), https://twitter.com/amatwyshyn/status/599611692255813632. 
 347.  Running a Westlaw query for articles with at least 25 instances of “cybersecurity” 
yields results of 195; the same query using “cyber security” yields 33 results; “information 
security” and “data security” yields results of 43 and 97 respectively. 
 348.  I See What You Did There, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/ 
memes/i-see-what-you-did-there (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 349. Game of Thrones: The North Remembers (HBO television broadcast Apr. 1, 2012). 
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reframing the paradigms of information sharing and deterrence into a 
novel security paradigm better suited to addressing the problem of 
reciprocal security vulnerability. 
A. Cybers, How Do They Work?:350 Lessons from Polanyi 
We can never see past the choices we don’t understand. 
—The Oracle351 
 
The philosophy of Friedrich Hayek has been widely applied in 
legal scholarship to analyze questions of innovation.352 For example, 
Professor Tim Wu has applied Hayek’s analysis of the benefits of 
decentralization and emerging order to questions of intellectual 
property rights, industry structure and “the effect of rights 
assignments on the decision architectures of affected industries.”353 
But, before there was Hayek’s well-known concept of “spontaneous 
order,” there was Michael Polanyi’s notion of “dynamic order.”354 
It is Polanyi’s work rather than Hayek’s that better lends itself to 
inspiring novel frameworks for innovation policy areas such as 
information security. Polanyi’s work reflects an embeddedness of the 
individual within a broader society that stands wholly apart from 
economic considerations; unlike Hayek’s work, Polanyi’s work does 
not focus on the primacy of economics. Instead, it views emergent 
scientific knowledge and law as equal, if not more important, forces 
alongside economics. This three-part focus—science, law, and 
 
 350. “Miracles” / Fucking Magnets, How Do They Work?, KNOW YOUR MEME, http:// 
knowyourmeme.com/memes/fucking-magnets-how-do-they-work (last visited Jan. 11, 2018). 
 351. THE MATRIX (Village Roadshow Pictures 1999). 
 352.  See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Hayek on Monopoly and Antitrust in the Crucible of 
United States v. Microsoft, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 167 (2005); Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive 
Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 
FED. COMM. L.J. 483 (2009). 
 353.  See Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 123, 124 (2006). 
 354.  Michael Polanyi was an underappreciated predecessor to and contemporary of 
Friedrich Hayek. Some of Hayek’s core observations regarding spontaneously emerging order 
are asserted to be more correctly attributed to Polanyi. See, e.g., Struan Jacobs, Michael 
Polanyi  and Spontaneous Order, 1941-1951, 24 POLANYI SOC’Y PERIODICAL, no. 2, 1997, at 
14, http://polanyisociety.org/TAD%20WEB%20ARCHIVE/TAD24-2/TAD24-2-pg14-28-
pdf.pdf (“[W]ork of Polanyi, an essay-collection published in 1951, predated Hayek’s The 
Constitution of Liberty by almost a decade and, indeed, several of the essays had been published 
in journals well before 1951.”). 
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economics—makes Polanyi’s work a compelling and logical 
touchstone for innovation policy discussions. 
Despite its natural fit for innovation law and policy, Polanyi’s work 
has never been expansively355 applied in the law review literature to 
questions of security,356 and only a small number of articles in the 
current legal scholarship engage with Polanyi’s scholarship 
substantially.357 Three scholars have applied Polanyi’s work to 
intellectual property concerns: Professor Russell Hardin has analyzed 
a concrete proposal made by Polanyi for patent reform,358 Professor 
Ron Bouchard has applied Polanyi to the discussion of appropriate 
PHOSITA skill construction in pharmaceutical patent litigation,359 
and Professor Margaret Chon has used Polanyi’s construct of tacit 
knowledge to discuss what she has termed “sticky knowledge” in 
copyright.360 Non-intellectual property scholarship employing 
Polanyi’s theory includes the work of Professor Kevin Keeler, who has 
presented an alternative account of mental state inference processes 
based upon Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge.361 Professor Charles 
Barzun has explained that Polanyi’s work likely influenced the legal 
theory of H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, who corresponded with 
Polanyi.362 And, finally, Professor David ButleRitchie has applied 
Polanyi’s insights to legal pedagogy.363 This Part contributes to the 
existing scholarship by using Polanyi’s philosophy of science to 
reframe the legal discussion of information security and to address 
reciprocal security vulnerability. 
 
 355.  It has been mentioned briefly by some authors, however. See infra note 356. 
 356.  The two most extensive uses appear in Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659, 660 (1993) (discussing patent reform), and Charles L. Barzun, The 
Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 49 (2013) (discussing Hart 
and  Sacks). 
 357.  A Westlaw query of secondary sources with 15+ mentions of Michael Polnayi’s work 
yielded limited results. 
 358.  Hardin, supra note 356, at 659. 
 359.  See generally Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy: Inventive 
Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie That Binds Obviousness and Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical 
Litigation, 4 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1 (2007). 
 360. See generally Margaret Chon, Sticky Knowledge and Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 177. 
 361. See generally Kevin L. Keeler, Direct Evidence of State of Mind: A Philosophical Analysis 
of How Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions Regarding Mental State, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 435. 
 362. Barzun, supra note 356, at 49–52. 
 363. David T. ButleRitchie, Situating “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Within Legal Pedagogy, 50 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29 (2002). 
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1. Forever cyberalone:364 The pain of polycentric problems 
For Polanyi, humans are driven in part by notions of progress, 
innovation, and science as ends in themselves. As Polanyi puts it: 
“Freedom of science, freedom of worship, freedom of thought in 
general, are public institutions by which society opens to its members 
the opportunity for serving aims that are purposes in themselves.”365 
This assertion of significant, intrinsic, nonpecuniary366 motivation 
resonates with the scholarly findings of the psychology of creativity367 
and with those of legal scholars such as Professor Jessica Silbey.368 This 
resonant framing also makes Polanyi a fit for the ethos and culture of 
the information security community. 
Polanyi’s work offers us important insights on a way forward in 
information security: as a philosopher of science, he was committed to 
scientific inquiry as the route to solving what he defined as 
“polycentric” problems—those that involve “balancing a large 
number of elements.”369 For Polanyi, “[t]he proper method of 
managing a polycentric task is . . . not by collecting all the data at one 
centre and evaluating them jointly” but rather by relying on an 
uncoordinated “team of independent calculators,” each of whom 
solves the problem “in respect to one centre at a time.”370 Indeed, 
Polanyi explains the process toward solutions of polycentric problems 
as inherently and intentionally incremental371: 
Imagine that we are given the pieces of a very large jigsaw puzzle, 
and suppose that for some reason it is important that our giant 
puzzle be put together in the shortest possible time. . . . The only 
way the assistants can effectively co-operate, and surpass by far what 
 
 364.  Forever Alone, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/forever-
alone (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 365. MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 
193  (1951). 
 366. See McLaughlin, supra note 155. 
 367. See, e.g., JENNIFER MUELLER, CREATIVE CHANGE (2017). 
 368. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014). 
 369. See POLANYI, supra note 365, at 176. 
 370. Id. at 180–81. Polanyi called this “the Relaxation Method.” Id. at 180–83 
 371. Id. at 159 (“When order is achieved among human beings by allowing them to 
interact with each other on their own initiative—subject only to laws which uniformly apply to 
all of them—we have a system of spontaneous order in society.”). 
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any single one of them could do, is to let them work on putting the 
puzzle together in sight of the others so that every time a piece of it 
is fitted in by one helper, all the others will immediately watch out 
for the next step that becomes possible in consequence. Under this 
system, each helper will act on his own initiative, by responding to 
the latest achievements [of] the others, and the completion of their 
joint task will be great accelerated. We have here in a nutshell the 
way in  which a series of independent initiatives are organized to a 
joint  achievement by mutually adjusting themselves at every 
successive  stage to the situation created by all the others who are 
acting  likewise.372 
Applying lessons from Polanyi, it might be said that the challenges 
we are witnessing in crafting successful information security law and 
policy potentially result at least in part from four factors. The first two 
are a natural consequence of the substantive character of information 
security as a discipline—first, the polycentrism of the challenges of 
information security and, second, the necessity of incrementalism 
under time pressure. The third and fourth factors relate to what 
Polanyi calls “tacit knowledge” and “subsidiary awareness.” 
2. Y U NO cyber?:373 Transmission of tacit knowledge 
Polanyi’s work identifies a third factor that may be less obvious 
but is equally important—tacit knowledge. A “tacit knowledge” 
conflict currently exists within the two “dynamic orders,” security 
researchers and lawyers, who are working to try to address the 
challenges of information security.374 Polanyi views both science and 
law as “dynamic orders,”375 or iteratively self-adjusting groups of 
individuals with influence.376 He characterizes science as 
predominantly a “cognitive” dynamic order, but he deemed law a 
 
 372.  See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 
1  Minerva, no.1, 1962, at 54, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5100/ 
polanyi_1967.pdf. 
 373.  “Y U NO” Guy, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/y-u-no-
guy (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 374.  See discussion of incommensurability, supra Section II.B.2. 
 375. Just as scientific and technical communities build knowledge internally in a 
dynamically ordered manner, common or case law, Polanyi explained, “arises by a process of 
direct adjustments between succeeding judges.” Michael Polanyi, The Growth of Thought in 
Society, 8 ECONOMICA 428, 436 (1941). 
 376. Id. 
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“mainly normative” one.377 He explains that “[i]n  each field” 
generations pass on “a public mental heritage”378 comprised of both 
substantive and “tacit knowledge,”379 the unspoken but shared culture 
of “knowing how” one obtains only from being inside the 
community.380 Thus, in information security, two dynamically ordered 
professions—one cognitive (security researchers) and one normative 
(lawyers)381—clash. Two meaningfully different types of “public 
mental heritage”382—law and computer security—with different and 
elaborate bodies of “tacit knowledge” must learn to cooperate with 
each other to address the polycentric problem of information security. 
In other words, these two communities, lawyers and security 
professionals, must reconcile not only the patent process of dynamic 
cooperation on the substance of information security, but also more 
generally they must address the latent conflict of their baselines of tacit 
knowledge. Both relevant dynamic order of experts—security 
researchers and lawyers—must acquire each others’ perspectives. This 
is the challenge that lurks beneath the surface of the security policy 
debate—the challenge of what Polanyi calls  “comprehension.”383  
As Polanyi explains, “The structure of tacit knowing is manifested 
most clearly in the act of understanding. It is the process 
of  comprehending: a grasping of disjointed parts into a 
comprehensive  whole.”384 In other words, both relevant dynamic 
orders of experts—security researchers and lawyers—must become 
part of Polanyi’s metaphorical jigsaw puzzle team. Making progress in 
information security law and policy will require that the tacit 
 
 377. Id. at 438. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Through consultation, competition, or a combination of the two, new participants 
adjust to the evolution of the space. “Then, when they suggest their own additions or reforms, 
they return to the public and claim publicly that these be accepted by society–to become in their 
turn a part of the common heritage.” Id. 
 380. He explains that “[p]ractical skills and practical experience contain much more 
information than people possessing this expert knowledge can ever tell. Particulars that are not 
known focally are unspecifiable . . . A man’s mind can be known only comprehensively, by dwelling 
within the unspecifiable particulars of its external manifestations.” MICHAEL POLANYI, THE 
STUDY OF MAN 33 (1958). 
 381. Polanyi would describe both as “circles of special interest and professional bodies” 
who act as gatekeepers. Polanyi, supra note 375, at 441. 
 382. Id. at 438. 
 383. See POLANYI, supra note 380, at 28. 
 384. See id. 
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knowledge of both security researchers and lawyers become mutually 
comprehended. Employing the perspectives of lawyers alone in policy, 
quashing the technical objections of researchers and security 
engineers, will irreparably harm both innovation and the national 
security of the United States.385 
3. Wow! Such cyber:386 Subsidiary awareness 
Without becoming Polanyi’s hypothetical cooperating jigsaw 
puzzle team, both security researchers and lawyers will arrive at 
suboptimal and inefficient processes and outcomes.387 Polanyi explains 
that “[b]y looking very closely at the several parts of a whole, we may 
succeed in diverting our attention from the whole and even lose sight 
of it altogether.”388 In this way, Polanyi explains and cautions against 
the risks of the privacy conflation problem identified in Part II. 
Polanyi’s work also offers a warning to be vigilant of the 
incommensurability problems introduced in Part II.389 He asserts:  
We have seen how comprehension can be destroyed altogether by 
shifting attention from its focus to its subsidiary particulars. It is not 
 
 385. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 386. Doge, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/doge (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 387. As Polanyi explains, “[w]e cannot comprehend a whole without seeing its parts, but 
we can see the parts without comprehending the whole. Thus we may advance from a knowledge 
of the parts to the understanding of the whole.” POLANYI, supra note 380, at 29. 
 388. Id. Polanyi explains further: 
Once comprehension is achieved, we are not likely to lose sight again of 
the whole; yet comprehension is not completely irreversible. . . . 
These psychological observations can be transposed now into the 
elements of a theory of knowledge. We may say that when we comprehend 
a particular set of items as parts of a whole, the focus of our attention is 
shifted from the hitherto uncomprehended particulars to the 
understanding of their joint meaning. This shift of attention does not make 
us lose sight of the particulars, since one can see a whole only by seeing its 
parts, but it changes altogether the manner in which we are aware of the 
particulars. We become aware of them now in terms of the whole on which we 
have fixed our attention. I shall call this a subsidiary awareness of the 
particulars, by contrast to a focal awareness which would fix attention on 
the particulars in themselves, and not as parts of a whole. I shall also speak 
correspondingly of a subsidiary knowledge of such items, as distinct from 
a focal knowledge of the same items. 
Id. at 29–30 (emphasis in original). 
 389. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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surprising, therefore, that we may often apprehend wholes without 
ever having focally attended to their particulars. In such cases we are 
actually ignorant, or perhaps more precisely speaking, focally 
ignorant of these particulars; we know them only subsidiarily in 
terms of what they jointly mean, but cannot tell what they are 
in  themselves.390 
Finally, Polanyi’s work similarly holds insights on addressing the 
internet exceptionalism problem we see in information security law 
and policy as detailed in Part II.391 He reminds us to focus on 
technologies’ purpose, not on technologies as objects themselves.392 
He warns that, for example, “[t]he skillful use of a tennis racket can 
be paralysed by watching our racket instead of attending to the ball 
and the court in front of us.”393 He calls this focus on the whole while 
engaging with particulars the state of “subsidiary awareness,”394 and 
he contrasts subsidiary awareness with the less productive state of 
“focal awareness,”395 focusing on particulars while missing the 
whole.396 When examining the highly compartmentalized and 
definitionally-muddled approaches to security in the public and private 
sector described in Part II, it becomes obvious that our first step in 
improving the state of information security involves striving for 
subsidiary awareness. 
Polanyi’s work, however, still leaves us without guidance 
regarding learning to anticipate the next generation of information 
security problems specifically. With this query, let us turn to the Monty 
Hall problem for a lesson on perspective-taking. 
 
 
 390. See POLANYI, supra note 380, at 32–33. 
 391. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 392. See POLANYI, supra note 380, at 30–31 (“Symbols can serve as instruments of 
meaning only by being known subsidiarily while fixing our focal attention on their meaning. 
And this is true similarly of tools [and] machines. . . . Their meaning lies in their purpose; they 
are not tools, machines, etc., when observed as objects in themselves, but only when viewed 
subsidiarily by focusing attention on their purpose.”). 
 393. Id. at 31. 
 394. Id. at 30. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
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B. You Had One Cyberjob:397 The Monty Hall Problem 
Buttercup: And to think, all that time it was your cup 
that  was poisoned.  
 
Man in Black: They were both poisoned. I spent the last few 
years building up an immunity to iocane powder.398  
 
The Monty Hall problem399 is a notorious400 probability question 
that initially foiled some of the greatest minds in mathematics.401 
Although the question appears simple,402 it is frequently 
confounding403 because it exploits the conflict between human 
intuition and math.404 The problem is set forth as follows: imagine that 
you are a contestant on a game show where Monty Hall405 is the host. 
Monty tells you that behind the three doors in front of you, there are 
two goats and one car.406 Your task is to guess which of the doors 
conceals the car.407 You select one door, say door number one. Monty 
 
 397. You Had One Job, KNOW YOUR MEME, knowyourmeme.com/memes/you-had-one-
job (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 398. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987). 
 399.  The Monty Hall Problem, RANDOM, www.math.uah.edu/stat/games/MontyHall
.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 400.  See Zachary Crockett, The Time Everyone “Corrected” the World’s Smartest Woman, 
PRICEONOMICS (Aug. 2, 2016), https://priceonomics.com/the-time-everyone-corrected-the-
worlds-smartest/. 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Now Playing Let’s Make A Deal, UCSD MATHEMATICS, https://math.ucsd.edu
/~crypto/Monty/montybg.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018). 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Id. 
 405.  Monty Hall was a television personality in the 1970s on the TV game show, Let’s 
Make a Deal. See, Monty Hall Biography, BIOGRAPHY, www.biography.com/people/monty-hall-
9542238 (last updated Oct. 2, 2017). 
 406.  Game Show Problem, MARILYNVOSSAVANT.COM, marilynvossavant.com/game-show-
problem/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 407.  Id. The framing of this problem presumes that a car is preferable to a goat—a bold 
assumption. Goats are charming creatures whose lawn mowing and garbage consumption 
capabilities are both formidable and ecologically desirable. Indeed, an industry of goat rentals 
has emerged. See Hire a Goat Grazer, COOLEST STUFF EVER, https://thecooleststuffever.com/ 
hire-goat-grazer (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). Goats have also introduced new market 
segmentation into yoga, and current demand for goat yoga classes outstrips supply. “Pee on Your 
Yoga Mat”: Goat Yoga Craze is Sweeping the Country, USA TODAY (Apr. 28, 2017, 12:28 PM) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/04/28/pee-your-yoga-mat-goat 
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Hall opens a different door, say door number two, and it reveals a 
goat.408 Monty Hall then asks you if you would like to change your 
selected door to door number three.409 By working through the 
probability analysis, mathematically it makes sense to switch doors to 
the unselected door.410 Yet, intuitively, most people hesitate to align 
their choices with the math and fail to switch.411 The Monty Hall 
problem has been referenced in legal literature in, for example, 
discussions of offender profiling,412 standards of proof,413 
paternalism,414 the psychology of litigation,415 and bias in decision-
making.416 It has not to date been  applied to questions of information 
security, technology, or  innovation. 
Now, let us try the Monty Hall problem again, but this time let us 
analyze it as an information security problem of adversarial 
perspective-taking. Because you are assigned the role of the 
contestant, your assigned perspective has likely colored your analysis 
of the situation—in much the same way that we are taught that wall 
clocks with hands run clockwise.417 Now, invert your thinking. Let us 
rerun the problem where you analyze the decisions and your conduct 
not from your assigned role, but instead from the strategic position of 
 
-yoga-craze-sweeping-country/307495001/l; Goat Yoga? A Look at the Latest Fitness Craze, 
NBC NEWS (June 16, 2017) https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/goat-yoga-a-
look-at-the-latest-fitness-craze-969581123698; AJ Willingham, “Goat Yoga” is a Thing – and 
Hundreds are Lining Up for it, CNN (Jan 12, 2017, 11:08 AM) http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/01/12/health/goat-yoga-oregon-trnd/index.html. 
 408.  Now Playing Let’s Make a Deal, supra note 402.  
 409.  Id. 
 410.  In other words, it has a 2/3 chance of hiding the car. Id. 
 411.  They erroneously intuit their chances to be 50/50 between the two doors. One reply 
to this failing of intuition is that one should simply trust the math. Yet, this response is not 
intuitively satisfying. Id. 
 412.  See D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus 
Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of 
Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193 (2002). 
 413.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Death of Paradox: The Killer Logic Beneath the Standards of 
Proof, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2013). 
 414.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1165 (2003). 
 415.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 113 (1996). 
 416.  See Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 687 (2009). 
 417.  For an example of a clock whose hands run backwards see, e.g., Andrea Matwyshyn 
(@amatwyshyn), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2015, 5:45 AM), https://twitter.com/amatwyshyn/ 
status/674585635211079680. 
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Monty Hall. By understanding Monty, you understand both sets of 
information dynamics—both yours and his—empowering yourself 
with a more thorough analytical framework. Monty Hall is your 
adversary418 who acts as an “oracle”:419 he knows a secret, and you can 
ask him about that secret, but he has no incentive to help you. Still, 
his responses reveal potentially useful information about the secret. 
He knows where the car is and, therefore, when he reveals where the 
car isn’t, he “leaks” potentially useful information to you. 
At the beginning of the problem, both you and Monty each had a 
one-third chance that you would guess the car correctly. But, in the 
second round, the dynamics have changed. Monty knows whether you 
have, in fact, guessed correctly. But he has no incentive to tell you. 
The information balance has now shifted in his favor. He will now act 
strategically to his advantage when he opens a particular door hiding 
a goat. In doing so, he has potentially steered your attention away 
from another door—the door more likely to have a car. In this way, he 
provides you with useful information when analyzed in the context of 
his motivations and superior knowledge. You should, therefore, 
logically change your chosen door and pick the door from which 
Monty has potentially steered you away.420 
This type of strategic adversarial thinking is the “secret sauce” of 
most skilled information security researchers and strategists. One 
might view it as akin to the skill of being able to tell time on clocks 
that run not only clockwise, but also on clocks that run 
counterclockwise. It is only by putting yourself in the mind of the 
adversary and understanding his incentives, motivations, and “tells” 
that you develop the skills to correctly anticipate your own 
vulnerabilities. As Polanyi might say, it is through seeing the problem 
 
 418.  In cryptography, an adversary is a malicious entity attempting to prevent you from 
achieving your goals. See, e.g., Ananth Raghunathan, Proofs in Cryptography (2012), https:// 
crypto.stanford.edu/~ananthr/docs/crypto-proofs.pdf (unpublished handout).  
 419.  An oracle is “a black box input/output method. It will respond to any input with a 
pseudo-random response but will always give the same output for a specific input.” See What is 
a Cryptographic Oracle?, INFO. SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2012), https://security.stackexchange. 
com/questions/10617/what-is-a-cryptographic-oracle. 
 420.  For a humorous depiction of this type of analytical process, see Princess Bride, supra 
note 398 (“But it’s so simple. All I have to do is divine from what I know of you: are you the 
sort of man who would put the poison into his own goblet or his enemy’s? Now, a clever man 
would put the poison into his own goblet, because he would know that only a great fool would 
reach for what he was given. I am not a great fool, so I can clearly not choose the wine in front 
of you. But you must have known I was not a great fool, you would have counted on it, so I can 
clearly not choose the wine in front of me.”). 
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as a whole and with the eyes of the attacker that you acquire the 
requisite tacit knowledge—the practical skills and practical 
experience—of thinking like an attacker in order to anticipate attacks. 
When one begins to think like an attacker in security, it becomes 
apparent that choice of target for attackers is primarily driven by the 
nature of the information that the target holds and the extent of 
vulnerability of the target’s system. In other words, the fiercest 
information security adversaries do not generally distinguish between 
private sector and public sector entities. They strike wherever desirable 
information resides and where unpatched vulnerabilities allow for ease 
of security compromise. This insight lies at the core of addressing the 
problem of reciprocal security vulnerability. 
Thus, when we adopt this perspective taking approach from our 
analysis of the Monty Hall problem and blend it with the insights from 
Polanyi discussed in the previous section, we understand that the only 
path to successful information security policy is through a 
simultaneous, mutually reinforcing security effort in both the public 
and private sector. Both sectors must not only work together toward 
the common goal of comprehension of security but also lead each 
other by example and nudge each other toward continual 
improvement. This reciprocal leadership by example approach starts 
with the injection of a healthy dose of the critical self-reflection that 
First Amendment theorists have called epistemological humility.421 
C. Are You a Cyberwizard?:422  
The Principle of Epistemological Humility 
Actually, I’m an overnight success, but it took 
twenty  years. 
—Monty Hall423 
 
 
 421.  Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific 
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (1990) 
(“The principle of epistemological humility’ . . .posits that whatever the currently prevailing 
beliefs may be, history teaches us that scientific or moral advances may at some future point 
make those beliefs appear either silly or monstrous.”). 
 422.  Are You a Wizard, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/are-
you-a-wizard (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 423.  Monty Hall Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors 
/m/monty_hall.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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Security professionals have long warned of the arrival of a caste of 
security “charlatans.”424 But distinguishing goats from sheep425 in 
security itself requires training. People who hold themselves out as 
“cybersecurity experts” are not uniformly skilled.  
In one of the most famous episodes of the British technology 
comedy The IT Crowd,426 two of the main characters—disgruntled 
technology professionals Moss and Roy—convince their technology-
illiterate manager that the internet emanates from a small black box 
with a blinking red light that usually sits at the top of Big Ben.427 They 
present this magic box and encourage their manager, Jen, to use it as 
the centerpiece of her upcoming employee of the month talk, which 
they write for her and fill with techno-gibberish.428 Because of her lack 
of technical knowledge, she does not detect that anything is amiss and 
presents the talk exactly as Moss and Roy have scripted, including 
prominently displaying “The Internet” to her audience.429 As Moss 
and Roy sit in the back of the room hoping to revel in their cleverly 
orchestrated humiliation of their boss, their plans go horribly awry: 
the members of the audience—people apparently even more 
technologically-illiterate than their boss—believe every word of her 
techno-gibberish speech and chant enthusiastically, hoping for more 
of Jen’s pearls of technical wisdom.430 
Thus, part of the security puzzle involves identifying the Jens of 
the world who overclaim their expertise; bad security decisions happen 
in part when people fail to recognize the limitations of their own 
knowledge and fail to defer to genuine expertise. Without recognizing 
the limitations of their own knowledge, they easily fall prey to the 
Mosses and Roys of the world, self-interested actors who inject 
disinformation. Indeed, a “cyberdabbler” problem has manifested in 
legal and policy circles in the last five years: a wave of policy and legal 
experts from other domains are seeking to rebrand themselves speedily 
 
 424.  Errata – Charlatans, ATTRITION.ORG, http://attrition.org/errata/charlatan/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 425.  Sheep is a term used to refer to compromised users and machines in security. See 
George Ou, Wall of Sheep at DEFCON Illustrates What Not to Do, ZDNET (Aug. 4, 2006, 9:35 
AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/wall-of-sheep-at-defcon-illustrates-what-not-to-do/. 
 426.  See The IT Crowd (Channel 4 television broadcast).  
 427.  See The IT Crowd: The Speech (Channel 4 television broadcast (Dec. 12, 2008)). 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Id. 
 430.  Id. 
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as “cyber” experts, mistakenly believing the field of information 
security policy to be something quickly learnable.431 Understanding 
security, much like understanding law, requires years of tacit 
knowledge acquisition by learning from and engaging with technical 
security professionals on their turf and terms. Indeed, one leading 
security professional and former NSA employee432 recently explained 
the problem as follows: “the law profession is not without its hubris 
and thinks that it can pretty much define anything. Sometimes they 
even try to redefine mathematical constants such as Pi.”433 He is not 
wrong. For example, one legal scholar has recently argued that security 
engineers and their long-standing, technically-rigorous definitions are 
part of the problem in security,434 arguing that “cybersecurity” 
definitions should be “socially-constructed” around “accuracy,” as 
such (new and vague435) term presumably would be defined 
by  lawyers.436 
First Amendment theorists would argue that the appropriate 
response to this type of legal hubris concern is conscious engagement 
with the principle of “epistemological humility.”437 As described by 
Professor Martin Redish, whose work most extensively references the 
 
 431.  See Michail S, Closing Plenary: Information Security Programs in 
Academia,  [SHMOOCON 2016], YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=rn0BdODPSbA. 
 432.  See Dave Aitel, RSA CONFERENCE, https://www.rsaconference.com/speakers/ 
dave-aitel (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 433.  See Dave Aitel, Why 0day is a Nebulous Concept, Part 1!, CYBERSECPOLITICS (Feb. 
16, 2016, 7:42 AM), http://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2016/02/why-0day-is-nebulous-
concept-part-1.html. 
 434.  See Bambauer, supra note 180, at 827 (“Treating integrity as an inherent quality of 
the stored data has a long history, and engineers are reluctant to re-examine the concept.”). 
 435.  As any transactional attorney will tell you, definitional precision and reliance on 
external technical standards is desirable; it creates greater certainty for all parties. Definitional 
vagueness or ambiguity, on the other hand, creates business risk. For example, companies 
participate in standard setting bodies for this reason, and contracts often specify that parties must 
be certified to comply with international standards. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/home.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018). 
 436.  See Bambauer, supra note 180, at 852–53 (“Informational accuracy is at the heart of 
cybersecurity . . . accuracy is an outcome of societal processes, into which data is an important 
but not singular input.”). 
 437.  Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific 
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (1990) 
(“[T]he ‘principle of epistemological humility’ . . . posits that whatever the currently prevailing 
beliefs may be, history teaches us that scientific or moral advances may at some future point 
make those beliefs appear either silly or monstrous.”). 
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concept,438 the “principle posits that whatever the currently prevailing 
beliefs may be, history teaches us that scientific or moral advances may 
at some future point make those beliefs appear either silly or 
monstrous.”439 Thus, argues Redish, “any attempt by the government 
to impose a national scientific orthodoxy could undermine or inhibit 
the advance of scientific knowledge, thus undermining a key value of 
the first amendment.”440  
Discussions of epistemological humility and democracy permeate 
the First Amendment scholarship,441 but references also exist outside 
of the First Amendment context. For example, Professor David Luban 
has referenced epistemological humility in the context of social 
responsibility of attorneys,442 and Professor Rebecca Tushnet has used 
epistemological humility concerns in her work on fair use and 
copyright.443 However, to date, the law review literature has not 
injected epistemological humility into the information security 
debate—an injection long overdue. 
In the context of information security, the principle of 
epistemological humility cautions us to create evolutionary legal 
frameworks deferential to technical expertise and the changing state 
of the art of security research. We should eschew imposing what 
Professor Redish has called “a national scientific orthodoxy”444 
through law. Instead, we need policy and law with robust, formal 
input mechanisms from technical security experts, thereby avoiding 
the epistemological “sin” of legal hubris. 
 
 438.  See, e.g., id. 
 439.  Id. 
 440.  Id. 
 441.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech 
Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 677 (2013) (engaging with epistemological humility and 
stating that Redish claims that his rationale “does not represent a firmly held theory of moral 
epistemology so much as an instrumental construct designed to avoid totalitarianism” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 
890 (2015) (“The relatively new epistemological humility expressed in cases such as Cariou is a 
welcome respite from what Zahr Said has characterized as formalism in the mode of New 
Criticism, in which judges treat works as having only one correct meaning.”). 
 442.  See David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 955 (1995). 
 443. See Tushnet, supra note 441; Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and 
Epistemological Humility, 25 L. & LIT. 20 (2013); Rebecca Tushnet, Scary Monsters: Hybrids, 
Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2133 (2011). 
 444.  Redish, supra note 437, at 1435. 
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As such, the paradigm introduced in the next section strives for 
epistemological humility. It blends the insights of Polanyi with those 
of the Monty Hall problem, applying them to the jigsaw puzzle of 
reciprocal security vulnerability and offering a novel paradigm—the 
paradigm of reciprocal security. 
IV. CYBERFRIENDSHIP IS MAGIC:445 RECIPROCAL SECURITY   
In the iconic British television show Doctor Who,446 the 
protagonist, the Doctor,447 an alien448 Time Lord,449 travels across the 
space-time continuum450 inside a “police box”451 called the TARDIS.452 
Externally, the TARDIS appears453 to be merely a typical blue UK 
police telephone box from the 1960s.454 Occasionally, the Doctor 
invites a new companion455 to travel with him. Upon entering, the 
companions quickly realize that the TARDIS is not really a police box 
at all.456 Rather, it is a complex457 living organism458 that simply looks 
like a police box externally as an act of operational security or 
 
 445.  See My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme 
.com/memes/subcultures/my-little-pony-friendship-is-magic (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 446.  See Doctor Who (BBC television broadcast). 
 447.  Id. 
 448.  See Doctor Who: Rose (BBC television broadcast March 26, 2005) (“If you are an 
alien how come you sound like you’re from the North? The Doctor: Lots of planets have 
a  North!”). 
 449.  Id. 
 450.  See, e.g., The Tardis, DOCTOR WHO SITE, http://www.thedoctorwhosite.co.uk/ 
tardis/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 451.  Id. 
 452.  Id. 
 453.  As such, it frequently triggers the curiosity of onlookers who scrutinize its exterior. 
See, e.g., Doctor Who: An Unearthly Child: An Unearthly Child (BBC One television broadcast 
Nov. 23, 1963).  
 454.  See, e.g., Tardis Exterior, DOCTOR WHO SITE, http://www.thedoctorwhosite. 
co.uk/tardis/exterior/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 455.  See, e.g., The Doctor’s Companions, BBC: DOCTOR WHO, http://www.doctorwho. 
tv/50-years/companions/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 456.  See, e.g., TARDIS Interior and Console Rooms, DOCTOR WHO SITE, http:// 
www.thedoctorwhosite.co.uk/tardis/interior/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 457.  Its exterior is an inaccurate representation of its interior size. See, e.g., DW Supercuts, 
Doctor Who Supercut, YOUTUBE, https://youtu.be/is-Gnyk4AWE (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 458.  See, e.g., Doctor Who Answers: Is the TARDIS Alive?, FANDOM, http://doctorwho. 
answers.wikia.com/wiki/Is_the_TARDIS_alive (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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“OPSEC.”459 Much like the TARDIS, the study of information 
security policy is deceptively simple from the outside, but, from an 
insider’s perspective, it is a sophisticated and evolving jigsaw puzzle. 
Any successful legal paradigm must account for and accommodate this 
evolving complexity. For this reason, building on Part III’s lessons 
from Polanyi, the Monty Hall problem, and the First Amendment 
theory principle of epistemological humility, this Part introduces a 
“reciprocal security” paradigm for the field of information security law 
and policy, the field that many lawyers and policymakers—for better 
or worse—currently call “cybersecurity law.” 
A. Keep Calm and Cyber On:460 Shifting to Reciprocal Security 
Former West Point professor Greg Conti recently explained to an 
audience at a security conference that the term “cybersecurity” has 
historically referred solely to the military concept of nations fighting 
nations through the internet, and everything else is more appropriately 
referenced as “information security” or “data security.”461 This 
distinction has indeed historically seemed a logical one, and it reflects 
the general usage of security industry veterans like Conti.462 However, 
in light of the technical reality of reciprocal security vulnerability, this 
section argues in favor of a new sector-neutral framing for security—
the paradigm of reciprocal security. 
The reciprocal security paradigm’s explicitly sector-neutral 
approach represents a key theoretical shift. Government information 
security is, as a matter of technology, essentially parallel to that of 
private sector organizations. Government entities are organizations 
with employees, assets, missions, and points of information 
vulnerability, as are private sector entities. Indeed, as the problem of 
reciprocal security vulnerability detailed in Part II highlights, because 
of the technological interdependence of both sectors,463 it becomes 
functionally impossible to cabin off the vulnerabilities of the 
government and private sector from each other. 
 
 459. See, e.g., OPSEC Awareness for Military Members, DoD Employees and Contractors, 
CDSE, https://securityawareness.usalearning.gov/opsec/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 460. Keep Calm and Carry On, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/ 
memes/keep-calm-and-carry-on (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 461. Michail S, supra note 324, at 13:30. 
 462. Id. 
 463. See supra Section II.A.1. 
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Therefore, the reciprocal security paradigm replaces the two 
dominant security paradigms currently in use—information sharing 
and deterrence—with a single sector-neutral, innovation-sensitive 
paradigm composed of two interrelated components: first, the 
construction of a security vigilance infrastructure and, second, the 
concept of defense-primacy from an attacker perspective. 
1. The cyberbox is bigger on the inside:464 Building a security  
vigilance  infrastructure 
 
The Doctor: Well, Sergeant? Aren’t you going to say, “It’s 
bigger on the inside than it is on the outside”? Everybody 
else  does. 
 
Sgt. Benton: Well, it’s . . . pretty obvious, isn’t it?465 
 
Knowledge creation and innovation in security progress through 
the independent but cooperative scientific and engineering efforts of 
a community of technical experts—security researchers. But therein 
lies the innovation policy challenge of information security: any 
successful legal structures in information security must be flexible 
enough to allow for evolution of technical solutions, but yet be 
structured enough to create a framework capable of preserving citizen 
trust. Simply collecting and sharing uncoordinated information 
without a sense of its place in the bigger picture, warns Polanyi, will 
not assemble the puzzle correctly. 
Professor Brett Frischmann has argued that two types of 
infrastructure exist—traditional466 and non-traditional.467 Non-
traditional infrastructure commons, he argues, incorporate what he 
 
 464. Doctor Who - The Augmented Reality Tardis: It’s Bigger on the Inside, KNOW YOUR 
MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/videos/56515-doctor-who (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 465. Doctor Who: The Three Doctors: Episode One (BBC One television broadcast Dec. 
30,  1972). 
 466. See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Infrastructure Commons, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
121 (2005). 
 467. Id. at 124 (explaining that examples of non-traditional infrastructure include 
“environmental and information resources, such as lakes and ideas . . . [that] generate (or have 
the potential to generate) significant positive externalities that result in large social gains”). 
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calls “public infrastructure.”468 Public infrastructure for Frischmann 
includes ideas and information, such as basic research, when they meet 
three criteria: they can be consumed nonrivalrously, social demand is 
driven by downstream producers that require the resource as an input, 
and the range of goods produced downstream using these inputs 
varies across producers. He argues that public infrastructure requires 
additional government support “because of the inability of the market 
to process demand information for these goods.”469 This insight can 
be applied to meaningfully advance the conversation in security. The 
information structures needed for scaling security vulnerability 
information may fall within Professor Frischmann’s definition of 
information qualifying as public infrastructure.470 Indeed, it is precisely 
the absence of robust, scalable public infrastructure in security 
information that frustrates the efficacy of currently existing security 
information sharing  initiatives. 
Creating a security vigilance infrastructure requires us to carefully 
examine whether shared baselines of understanding and conduct exist 
in the ways that we discover, report, disclose, and react to the steady 
flow of changing information security threats across both the public 
and private sector. Currently, this type of information infrastructure 
exists to some extent in the security research community, but it suffers 
from inconsistencies in practice, high levels of informality and 
interpersonal relationship reliance, resource deficits, and an almost 
total absence of legal structures of enforcement.  
For example, we currently lack adequately uniform, scalable 
structures for third-party security audit requirements,471 vulnerability 
 
 468. Id. at 129. 
 469. Id. at 130. 
 470. See id. 
 471. A rigorous security audit would verify the handling of security vulnerabilities in line 
with the best practices of the information security industry at the time. For a discussion of current 
best practices in information security, see, for example, CIS Controls, CIS, https://www. 
cisecurity.org/critical-controls.cfm (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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assessment,472 indexing,473 and scoring474 in either the private or public 
sector. The existing vulnerability indexing structures, such as the 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system run by the 
MITRE Corporation,475 are struggling with the increased volume of 
vulnerabilities.476 Meanwhile, voluntary reporting structures, such as 
self-released security advisories, regularly suffer from inaccuracies and 
dramatic format variation to the point of sometimes rendering these 
disclosure documents incomparable in the opinions of vulnerability-
indexing experts.477 We currently lack adequate consistency and 
uniformity across our security information flows to be able to harness 
them effectively to advance the state of security knowledge. 
Meaningful information sharing cannot exist without correcting and 
rebuilding the information infrastructure that frames current 
information sharing. Thus, each of the dominant information security 
information flows should be mapped and connected to each other, 
identifying and filling in information gaps to create a self-reinforcing 
web of good security behaviors and scalable information disclosure.478 
In addition to these shortfalls regarding information silos and 
scalability, traditional paradigms of information sharing have created 
structures in which organizations share some information only after 
security failures have already occurred. While this is useful, a superior 
approach is one that is also predictive—one that, as Polanyi might say, 
facilitates comprehension of the big puzzle of security with subsidiary 
awareness. In other words, to whatever extent some deterrence of 
 
 472. For a discussion of vulnerability assessment see, for example, Critical Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessments, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/critical 
-infrastructure-vulnerability-assessments (last updated Apr. 17, 2017). 
 473. For a discussion of vulnerability indexing, see, for example, CVE List Home, CVE, 
https://cve.mitre.org/cve/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). But see Steve Ragan, Over 6,000 
Vulnerabilities Went Unassigned by MITRE’s CVE Project in 2015, CSO (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:00 
AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3122460/techology-business/over-6000-vulnerabi 
lities-went-unassigned-by-mitres-cve-project-in-2015.html. 
 474. For a discussion of vulnerability scoring, see, for example, Vulnerability Metrics, 
NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE, https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm (last visited Jan. 12, 
2018). But see, e.g., CARSTEN EIRAM & BRIAN MARTIN, THE CVSSV2 SHORTCOMINGS, 
FAULTS, AND FAILURES FORMULATION, https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/reports/CVSS-
ShortcomingsFaultsandFailures.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 475. See, e.g., CVE List Home, supra note 473. But see Ragan, supra note 473. 
 476. See Ragan, supra note 473. 
 477. See supra note 474. 
 478. See infra Part IV. 
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security criminality may be possible, it requires us to correctly predict 
the next generation of attacks before they occur. For this reason, the 
second element of the reciprocal security paradigm shifts the current 
dynamic away from an explicit deterrence focus toward the more 
anticipatory posture of defense primacy. 
2. More cybercowbell:479 Defense primacy 
This is one of the safest planets I know, there is never 
anything dangerous here! 
—The Doctor 
 
There are some sentences I should just keep away from. 
—The Doctor (after discovering the planet 
 is about to be covered in acid rain)480 
 
A series of compromises in December 2009 offers yet another 
stark example of the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability. 
Almost a decade ago, Google and approximately twenty other Silicon 
Valley companies suffered a sophisticated and intense attack that they 
believe to have been carried out by the Chinese government.481 
According to press accounts, the attackers were apparently looking for 
information on court orders and other information indicating whether 
U.S. law enforcement knew the identities of Chinese intelligence 
operatives.482 But Google also disclosed that the attackers had stolen 
intellectual property and targeted accounts of human rights activists 
perceived by China to oppose its government.483  
This 2009 attack also demonstrates why some categories of threats 
are unlikely to fit within traditional deterrence paradigms.484 Highly 
 
 479. Needs More Cowbell, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ 
needs-more-cowbell (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 480. Doctor Who: The Doctor: The Widow, and The Wardrobe (BBC One television broadcast 
Dec. 25, 2011). 
 481. See Nakashima, supra note 60; Zetter, supra note 60. 
 482. In particular, it appears the attackers were looking for evidence of court orders gaining 
access to Gmail accounts. See Nakashima, supra note 60. 
 483. David Drummond, Statement from Google: A New Approach to China, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 12, 2010; 6:09 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
01/12/AR2010011202903.html. 
 484. For a discussion of deterrence paradigms, see supra text accompanying notes 140–76. 
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motivated adversaries will rarely be deterred. In the wake of the attack, 
Silicon Valley companies recommitted themselves to forward-looking 
security initiatives and working harder to anticipate vulnerabilities485 
and attacks.486 Indeed, the success of bug bounty programs487 such as 
Google’s Chrome Rewards488 and the Department of Defense’s Hack 
the Army489 and Hack the Pentagon490 demonstrate that forward-
looking public and private sector organizations are  adopting a more 
market-driven,491 defense-oriented model492 with  success. 
Instead of deterrence alone, the second prong of the reciprocal 
security paradigm focuses on defense primacy. Defense primacy hinges 
on anticipating and preventing successful attacks to the greatest extent 
possible. It means taking a strategic long-term view of both public and 
private sector security in a forward-looking manner. In other words, 
it involves making sure that the puzzle pieces of security fit together. 
 
 485. For example, Google operates a robust bug bounty program. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Keane, Google Will Pay You $100K If You Can Pull off the Ultimate Chrome Hack, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Mar. 15, 2016, 4:11 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/google-
chrome-bug-bounty-raise/#ixzz4aNtZpYfk. 
 486. Google’s Chaos team is one example of this type of strategic preventative planning. 
See Julie Bort, Meet Kripa Krishnan, Google’s Queen of Chaos, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2016, 
10:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/profile-of-google-disaster-recovery-testing-boss-
kripa-krishnan-2016-8. 
 487. For a discussion of the benefits and challenges of bug bounty programs, see, for 
example, A Federal ‘Bug Bounty’ Program? HackerOne’s Katie Moussouris Weighs in on the 
Challenges, CYBERSCOOP, https://www.cyberscoop.com/radio/a-federal-bug-bounty-program
-hackerones-katie-moussouris-weighs-in-on-the-challenges/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 488. Chrome Reward Program Rules, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/ 
appsecurity/chrome-rewards/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 489. See, e.g., Christopher Ophardt, Army Secretary Issues Challenge with ‘Hack the Army’ 
Program, U. S. ARMY (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/178473. 
 490.  See, eg. Lisa Ferdinando, Carter Announces ‘Hack the Pentagon; Program Results, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (June 17, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/8028 
28/carter-announces-hack-the-pentagon-program-results. 
 491.  Some scholars have advocated formalizing these markets. Professor Jay Kesan and a 
coauthor recently proposed the formulation of vulnerability markets modeled on the commodity 
futures exchanges. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating A 
Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 753, 754 (2016) (proposing “a revolutionary market for vulnerabilities aimed at facilitating 
legitimate, transparent, and vendor-focused transactions of critical security information at a fair 
market price”). 
 492.  As recently noted by Abigail Slater, the General Counsel of the Internet Association, 
the “ROI on bug bounty programs is phenomenal.” For comments of Abigail Slater at 
CyConUS 2016, see Army Cyber Institute, Bug Bounty, at 35:52, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acWWT2R3LiI&index=15&list=PLtUuPz3a0Gz-PJOFb 
55O6jDZ68Ya9O9eS. 
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Unlike deterrence, defense primacy shifts enforcement priorities in a 
preventative direction by placing the focus on legally nudging 
organizations to implement security governance processes and become 
less attractive targets before attacks occur. In lieu of the Sisyphean task 
of deterring (sometimes undeterrable) attackers,493 defense primacy 
fosters a sense of shared legal and ethical responsibility for the security 
of our economy and country. It explicitly considers the problem of 
reciprocal security vulnerability and focuses on starting with 
addressing what we know to be effective in meaningfully improving 
security: fixing already-known security problems. 
Defense primacy involves not merely investigating and 
prosecuting computer intrusion offenders after intrusions have already 
occurred, it also involves enforcement activity and sanction of both 
public494 and private sector entities whose security governance 
inadequacies are obviously ripe for exploitation by attackers—in other 
words, intervening before an attack occurs, not merely after. Legal 
requirements to fix known security deficits are currently few.495 
Particularly in industries driven by a “legal compliance”496 mindset, 
the lack of many legal nudges to be proactive about security risk means 
that incentives for security improvements are perceived to be low.497 
 
 493.  See supra Part II. 
 494.  The quality of internal operations security of some governmental organizations is also 
still unacceptably low, despite a continuing onslaught of security compromises. See GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: AGENCIES NEED TO IMPROVE 
CONTROLS OVER SELECTED HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
680/677293.pdf. 
 495.  Apart from requirements of truthful descriptions of security practices in connection 
with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, to the extent a requirement to “fix” broken code 
currently exists in law, it arises primarily from sector-specific concerns—desire to avoid FTC 
enforcement actions for companies subject to FTC jurisdiction, and for medical device 
companies out of the new FDA postmarket guidance. But see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden 
Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital 
Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109, 110 (2010) (proposing a “reasonable expectation of code safety,” 
along with a three-tiered framework inspired by systems theory and the land-based duty to warn, 
protect and repair). 
 496.  See, e.g., Jonathan Sander, Cyber security: How a Compliance Mindset can Prove 
Dangerous, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2016), https://perspectives.eiu.com/technology-innov 
ation/cyber-security-how-compliance-mindset-can-prove-dangerous. 
 497.  For a discussion of incentives and security, see, for example, Bruce H. Kobayashi, 
Private Versus Social Incentives in Cybersecurity: Law and Economics, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 13 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2005) (discussing 
cybersecurity information as a public good). 
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A shift in thinking and legal priorities is needed. The reciprocal 
security paradigm’s shift toward defense primacy better allows 
Polanyi’s metaphorical puzzle pieces to come together in security. It 
is characterized by an adversarial mindset and an eye on the bigger, 
scalable picture. Now, let us briefly explore a series of concrete legal 
and policy initiatives arising from the reciprocal security paradigm.  
B. Cyberchallenge Accepted:498 Applying Reciprocal Security 
[People] love to say “We’ve always done it this way.” . . . 
That’s why I have a clock on my wall that runs 
counter- clockwise.499 
—Professor500/Rear Adm.501 Grace Hopper502 
 
This section applies the reciprocal security paradigm with a series 
of specific legislative, regulatory, and technical proposals. They are 
presented in two groups, mirroring the two prongs of the reciprocal 
security paradigm—security vigilance infrastructure and defense 
primacy. They explicitly blend the public and private sector  dynamics 
of security to begin to address the problem of reciprocal 
security  vulnerability. 
 
 498.  Challenge Accepted, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ 
challenge-accepted (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 499.  Dr. Grace Hopper famously quipped “Humans are allergic to change. They love to 
say, ‘We’ve always done it this way.’ I try to fight that. That’s why I have a clock on my wall that 
runs counter-clockwise.” Philip Schieber, The Wit and Wisdom of Grace Hopper, OCLC 
NEWSLETTER, no. 167, Mar./Apr. 1987, at 9. 
 500.  For a discussion of Dr. Grace Hopper’s career as a professor, see Grace Murray 
Hopper, GRACE HOPPER CELEBRATION OF WOMEN IN COMPUTING CONFERENCE (1994). 
 501.  For a discussion of Dr. Grace Hopper’s career as a naval officer, see id. 
 502.  Dr. Grace Hopper was a pioneer of computer science and the “mother of software.” 
She was posthumously awarded the presidential Medal of Freedom in 2016. See April Grant, 
Computer Science Legend, Rear Adm. Grace Hopper, Posthumously Receives Presidential Medal of 
Freedom, NAVY (Nov. 22, 2016, 4:32 PM), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story 
_id=97807. 
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1. That cyberescalated quickly:503 Creating security 
vigilance  infrastructure 
The first prong of the reciprocal security paradigm involves the 
creation of security vigilance infrastructures. A first cut at improving 
these structures should focus on the legal creation of robust, 
formalized feedback loops engaging technical experts.  
a. Proposal 1: Create new formal federal government security 
feedback loops. In the legislative branch, Congress can begin to address 
the problem of reciprocal security vulnerability with three changes. 
First, Congress should amend the Technology Assessment Act to 
create a new Congressional Office of Information Technology 
Assessment (OITA) to assist policymakers and the public in 
understanding technical questions of information technology.  In 
1972 the Technology Assessment Act504 established the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)505 with the goal of creating a 
feedback loop of bi-partisan506 technology expertise to inform 
lawmaking.507 OTA was defunded in 1995,508 but changed security 
circumstances now warrant reconsideration of this appropriations 
decision. A bi-partisan, in-house office of technology experts would 
assist Congress with new security challenges. This new OITA would 
maintain a bi-partisan advisory mission but would be limited in scope 
to matters of information technology policy, particularly advising on 
the technical aspects of information security. It would also include an 
advisory council with technical experts from the private sector.  
 
 503.  See, e.g., That Escalated Quickly, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com
/memes/that-escalated-quickly (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 504.  Office of Technology Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 92–484, 86 Stat. 797 (1972). 
 505.  The Technology Assessment Act states in relevant part “The basic function of the 
Office shall be to provide early indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the 
applications of technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the 
Congress.” Id. § 3(c). 
 506.  OTA was overseen by the “Technology Assessment Board” of 13 members: a non-
voting director, six senators (three from each of the minority and majority party), and six 
representatives (three from each party). Id. § 4. 
 507.  See infra note 533. 
 508.  See, e.g., Celia Wexler, Bring Back the Office of Technology Assessment, NY TIMES (May 
28, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/28/scientists-
curbing-the-ethical-use-of-science/bring-back-the-office-of-technology-assessment. 
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Second, Congress should follow the suggestion of the Copyright 
Office509 and amend the DMCA to make permanent the security 
research exemption granted during the 2015 triennial review of 
section 1201. As explained in Section II.B.2, the DMCA has 
historically chilled a portion of security research that benefits the safety 
of both the public and private sector.510 With the approval of a broad 
DMCA security research exemption in 2015 covering research on all 
products purchased by a consumer,511 the security research climate has 
materially improved.512 However, the current exemption requires 
regular renewal. Amending the DMCA to make the exemption 
permanent benefits both the public and private sector without altering 
any of the numerous other legal remedies copyright holders have at 
their disposal,513 as the Copyright Office explained. Congress should 
similarly update the CFAA to resolve confusion around its key 
terms  in order to provide as much clarity as possible for 
security  researchers.514  
Finally, Congress should instruct the Government Accountability 
Office to create an information security whistleblower “hotline” with 
a security ombudsman available to all government employees and 
government contractors. Some of the largest governmental breaches 
have occurred because employees and, in particular, private sector 
government contractors believed that their chain of command failed 
 
 509.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 OF TITLE 17, at 74 (2017), https://www. 
copyright.gov/policy/1201/section-1201-full-report.pdf 
 510.  See, e.g., Security Researchers filing (recounting various instances of security research 
that has not been performed on advice of counsel or performed only because of intervention 
and direct request from a Secretary of State and stating that “[a]ttorneys regularly counsel . . . 
that the DMCA is an unclear statute and that undertaking any such research exposes the 
researcher to legal risk. As such, attorneys usually counsel against continuing the research.”). 
BELLOVIN, supra note 237. 
 511.  See supra text accompanying notes 245–52. 
 512.  The exemption has already facilitated secondary analysis and critique by the press to 
arise regarding security of consumer products. See, e.g., Security Software Buying Guide, 
CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/security-software/buying-guide 
.htm (last updated Nov. 2017). 
 513.  Id. 
 514.  For a proposal regarding reframing the CFAA around definitions from information 
security and eliminating the term “authorized access” see Andrea M. Matwyshyn and Stephanie 
K. Pell, Broken (Nov. 17, 2017) (draft on file with author). 
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to take their security concerns seriously.515 Through setting up a 
Congressional whistleblower hotline as an official feedback loop, a 
portion of insider security compromises may be avoided. 
In the executive branch, the White House should expand future 
membership of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
to include all agencies and organizations directly engaged with 
information security enforcement. Consumer protection agencies 
directly involved with security enforcement, in particular the FTC, 
SEC, FCC, and FDA, have historically been absent from OSTP’s 
NSTC.516 As  such, this absence means that private sector innovation, 
competition,  and consumer protection concerns are comparatively 
underrepresented in OSTP consultations on security policymaking. 
Similarly, the White House should encourage the creation of a 
visiting technologist and scholar in residence program at every major 
agency (and ask Congress to appropriate funding accordingly).  This 
private sector feedback loop has already been successfully launched at 
the FTC517 and other agencies.518 Fixed-term private sector technical 
and legal experts can nudge security policymaking inside agencies in 
ways that career employees and political appointees cannot, and 
formalized exchanges of this nature facilitate tacit security knowledge 
exchange in both directions.519 
The White House should also execute an executive order requiring 
that all government organizations comply with the principles 
embodied in ISO standards on security, in particular the principles 
reflected in ISO 30111520 and 29147.521 These ISOs set forth baselines 
 
 515.  Jason Leopold, Marcy Wheeler & Ky Henderson, Exclusive: Snowden Tried to Tell 
NSA About his Concerns, VICE (June 4, 2016), https://news.vice.com/story/exclusive-
snowden-tried-to-tell-nsa-about-his-concerns. 
 516.  These agencies were not included in NSTC under the Obama administration. See 
NSTC Members, WHITE HOUSE https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/
ostp/nstc/about/members. 
 517.  See, e.g., Steve Dent, Meet the FTC’s New Chief Technologist, ENGADGET (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.engadget.com/2015/12/04/lorrie-cranor-ftc-chief-technologist/. 
 518.  See, e.g., Technologist in Residence Program, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/eere/ 
cemi/technologist-residence-program (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 519.  For a discussion of tacit knowledge, see supra Section III.A.2. 
 520.  ISO/IEC 30111:2013, ISO, https://www.iso.org/standard/53231.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 521.  ISO/IEC 29147:2014, ISO, https://www.iso.org/standard/45170.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
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of practice in the private sector with respect to organizational structure 
and processes in responding to security vulnerabilities. The principles 
embodied by these two standards make sense as governance baselines 
for organizations in the public sector as well.522 In this way, the 
standards of security in the private and public sector will be nudged to 
converge and evolve in tandem.  
Finally, the Department of Justice should take affirmative steps to 
protect technical private sector feedback through security research, 
particularly because Congress has not yet directly addressed the 
confusion surrounding the CFAA.523 First, DOJ should centralize 
CFAA indictment review, approval, and staffing in the Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) at Main Justice. 
Because of the importance of encouraging security research, CFAA 
indictments should not be within the exclusive or even predominant 
control of local US attorneys. Local US attorneys are more likely to 
lack an understanding of the bigger picture of security, 524 a picture 
better understood by CCIPS attorneys.525 Second, DOJ could create 
a CFAA feedback structure by borrowing its own model from 
numerous other effective feedback loop structures—antitrust 
enforcement policy statements,526 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
 
 522.  Meanwhile, the courts are likely to begin to incorporate these baselines of conduct 
into tort determinations of liability, creating a harmonized approach across both the public and 
private sector. 
 523.  For a discussion of the circuit splits currently plaguing interpretation of the CFAA, 
see, for example, Matwyshyn, supra note 281. 
 524.  The prosecution of Aaron Swartz raised questions for many observers regarding the 
appropriate balance between prosecutorial discretion and centralization of CFAA prosecutions. 
See, e.g., Justin Peters, A Year After Aaron Swartz’s Death, Our Terrible Computer Crime Laws 
Remain Unchanged, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2014/ 
01/13/aaron_swartz_cfaa_a_year_after_aaron_swartz_s_death_the_computer_fraud_and.html. 
The recent indictment of Marcus Hutchins, a security researcher who stopped the WannaCry 
ransomware, by a Wisconsin US Attorney has again raised questions regarding the desirability of 
local prosecutors having control over CFAA prosecutions.  Taylor Hatmaker, FBI Arrests 
WannaCry Hero for Alleged Role in Kronos Banking Malware, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/03/marcus-hutchins-malwaretechblog-arrest-fbi/. 
 525.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS AND ASSISTANT ATT’Y GENERALS FOR THE CRIMINAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
DIVISIONS 6 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/904941/download. 
 526.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/15/1791.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENTS OF ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N , STATEMENT 
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
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guidance,527 advisory statements,528 opinion procedure releases,529 
resource manuals,530 investigation closure statements531 or even the 
notice filing regime from its antitrust leniency program.532 Any of 
these existing DOJ feedback models would offer improved certainty 
for security researchers on DOJ’s interpretations of the CFAA as such 
positions  evolve.533 
In the judicial branch, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) should 
create a roster of trusted technical experts on information security as 
a technical feedback loop to assist judges, and, in collaboration with 
these experts, FJC should create a curriculum on information security.  
Similarly, the Administrative Office of the U.S. courts should use 
redundancy as a security measure for PACER filings by permitting 
universities, libraries, and other approved parties to maintain backup 
archives of PACER at their own expense. This step would also assist 
in providing more cost-effective access to indictments, cases, and 
other filings that are essential to attorneys both inside and outside the 
government. Because of the speed of legal evolution in information 
security, cost-effective access to legal filings is essential for both the 
public and private sector. In particular, computer intrusion 
indictments and pleadings are not readily available for review by 
computer science students and faculty in an affordable manner. 
 
PARTICIPATING IN THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/10/20/276458.pdf. 
 527.  See, e.g., Eric W. Sitarchuck & Alison Tanchyk, Department of Justice Quietly Revises 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nat 
lawreview.com/article/department-justice-quietly-revises-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-resourc 
e-guide. 
 528. See, e.g., STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 526. 
 529. See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal-fraud/opinion-procedure-releases (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 530. See Sitarchuck, supra note 527. 
 531. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Highmark’s Affiliation 
Agreement with West Penn Allegheny Health System (Apr. 10, 2012), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-
its-investigation. 
 532.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (updated 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-antitrust-divisions-
leniency-program. 
 533.  Antitrust law and securities regulation present two somewhat parallel examples of 
regimes with broad statutes creating both civil and criminal recourse for aggrieved parties. 
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Pacer534 rates535 are currently cost-prohibitive for students and faculty, 
who, as a consequence, have (undesirably) resorted to hit-or-miss self-
help remedies to gain access to legal information.536 
b.  Proposal 2: Improve security disclosure infrastructures across both 
the public and private sector to allow for meaningful progress tracking. 
At least three sets of disclosure structures should be buttressed in 
order to build another key component of a security vigilance 
infrastructure—updating the CVE system to scale effectively and 
address new technologies such as IoT, creating a  uniform security 
advisory notice and repository structure, and offering a 
uniform  data  breach notification form and central data breach 
notification  repository. 
Security vulnerabilities are currently indexed by MITRE through 
the CVE system.537 However, MITRE is struggling to keep up with 
the volume of vulnerabilities generated by IoT.538 An updated 
structure is needed to allow for vulnerability indexing to adequately 
scale. Similarly, the current structures of vulnerability indexing are 
completely opaque to consumers. In collaboration with consumer 
protection agencies, a consumer-usable version of vulnerability 
information should be created to allow consumers to monitor their 
home devices for vulnerabilities and learn to ask security questions at 
time of  purchase or new products.  
Prudent companies seek to preserve customer goodwill and 
reputation by issuing timely security advisories—software safety 
notices—when vulnerabilities are discovered in their code.539 
However, these advisories vary substantially in quality, accuracy, and 
 
 534.  See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). Meanwhile, private 
legal databases often lack complete indictment information. See, e.g., Selected Criminal Law 
Database, WESTLAW, https://lawschool.westlaw.com/marketing/display/RE/82 (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018) (containing “selected” criminal law materials). 
 535.  See PACER, ELECTRONIC ACCESS FEE SCHEDULE (2013), https://www. 
pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf. 
 536.  See, e.g., RECAP Project – Turning PACER Around, FREE LAW PROJECT, https:// 
free.law/recap/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 537.  See, e.g., CVE List Home, supra note 473. But see Ragan, supra note 473. 
 538.  Id. 
 539.  Security advisories may also be triggered by vulnerabilities in libraries or other 
incorporated code used in a product’s code base. 
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timeliness.540 State attorneys general, directly or with the help of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law 
(NCCUSL), and representatives of vulnerability database providers 
should work together to create a suggested uniform security advisory 
disclosure form and a centralized repository.541 Provided that such a 
form is widely adopted, meaningful analysis of vulnerability 
information and trends would be dramatically improved and 
facilitated. Fraudulent, misleading, or grossly negligent information 
on these uniform advisories can, in turn, provide subsequent basis for 
suit or enforcement activity.  
Data breach compliance personnel in industry consistently voice 
frustrations regarding two elements of state data breach notification 
requirements—variation across required formats for disclosure and 
variation in the correct point of state-level regulator notification.542 
Just as standardization happened in securities regulation with respect 
to the format of most blue sky filings,543 so too a standardized format 
can be drafted by NCCUSL544 or a coalition of state attorneys general 
to generate a suggested default data breach notification form. 
Provided the form is adequately robust,545 states could agree to accept 
this form in lieu of their current statutory disclosure requirements. 
Then, any one of these states could create a digital repository of all 
such forms, allowing citizens to search for information about the 
frequency of data breaches at particular companies. Federal agencies 
that suffer data breaches should lead by example by using the model 
 
 540.  STEVE CHRISTEY & BRIAN MARTIN, BUYING INTO THE BIAS: WHY VULNERABILITY 
STATISTICS SUCK, https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Martin-Buying-Into-The-Bias-
Why-Vulnerability-Statistics-Suck-Slides.pdf. 
 541.   See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade, of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of 
Dr. Andrea M. Matwyshyn), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20130718/
101152/HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-MatwyshynA-20130718.pdf. 
 542.   Id. 
 543.  Blue sky laws and their corresponding disclosure filings are the patchwork of state 
level securities regulation. For a discussion of blue sky laws see generally, Charles G. Stinner, 
Estoppel and In Pari Delicto Defenses to Civil Blue Sky Law Actions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
448  (1988). 
 544.  See, e.g., UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 545.  For details of what this form might look like, see Cyber Harder, the companion essay 
to this article, supra note 29. 
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form and making their data breach notification disclosures available 
on their own websites.  
2. All Your Cyber Are Belong to Us:546 Defense primacy  
Having introduced the proposals aimed at building a security 
vigilance infrastructure, let us now turn to three proposals that aim to 
bolster defense primacy. These proposals involve defending 
supply  chains, defending entrepreneurship, and defending market 
integrity.  They each similarly mitigate the problem of reciprocal 
security  vulnerability. 
a. Proposal 3: Defending supply chains to improve integrity. 
Persistent vulnerability in both the public and private sector 
sometimes arises because organizations fail to keep track of the 
software products they use (and the components and code libraries 
included in those products).547 Consequently, they fail to adequately 
monitor a portion of the security vulnerabilities that directly impact 
them.548 Federal and state governments—as well as private sector 
entities—should conduct an annual (or more frequent) internal 
organization assessment of supply chain vulnerability and security 
integrity for all products purchased by the organization.549  Vendors 
that fail to patch vulnerabilities on a timely basis should be deemed in 
material breach of agreements and blacklisted from procurement 
vendor lists. Because of the purchasing power of the U.S. government 
and public companies in particular, this approach, which combines 
better vulnerability assessments and blacklists, would trigger 
significant security improvements in supply chain integrity in both the 
public and private sectors expeditiously.550  
 
 546.  See, e.g., All Your Base Are Belong to Us, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyour 
meme.com/memes/all-your-base-are-belong-to-us (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 547.  See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Big Security Mistakes Companies Make When Buying 
Tech, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:38 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-security-
mistakes-companies-make-when-buying-tech-1489372011. 
 548.  Id. 
 549.  Open source products in particular present security challenges. See, e.g., Dan Geer & 
Joshua Corman, Almost Too Big to Fail, 39 USENIX, no. 4, Aug. 2014, at 66, https://www. 
usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/15_geer_0.pdf (explaining various vulnerabilities). 
 550.  One such bill has been introduced in a past Congressional session. See, e.g., Cyber 
Supply Chain Management and Transparency Act of 2014, H.R. 5793, 113th Cong. (2014), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5793. 
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b. Proposal 4: Defending entrepreneurship with security tax 
incentives and tools. Cash-strapped startups often struggle to learn 
about and implement security.551 Yet, their vulnerable products may be 
the most likely candidates for becoming harnessed into a botnet,552 
and, consequently used in an attack on critical infrastructure or 
healthcare553 targets. 
Security investment tax incentives for entrepreneurs would nudge 
material security improvements in much the same way that tax 
incentives were used to nudge environmental improvements.554 
Congress should instruct the Department of Commerce and the 
Internal Revenue Service to construct a tax incentive structure aimed 
at providing phased-out tax credits to small businesses who wish to 
invest in their information security through hiring additional security 
staff, obtaining security training, or purchasing security services.555  
Additionally, the FTC556 and the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA)557 have used contests under the America 
Competes Act, as renewed,558 as a way to stimulate entrepreneurship 
in security solutions. This type of contest approach should be 
 
 551.   For a discussion of startups and security, see, for example, Luis A. Aguilar, The Need 
for Greater Focus on the Cybersecurity Challenges Facing Small and Midsize Businesses, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/ 
cybersecurity-challenges-for-small-midsize-businesses.html (explaining that small and midsize 
businesses “face precisely the same threat landscape that confronts larger organizations, but 
[they] must do so with far fewer resources”). 
 552.  For a discussion of botnets and security risks, see, for example, Botnets, F-SECURE, 
https://www.f-secure.com/en/web/labs_global/botnets (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 553.  Hospitals currently face a ransomware problem, and threats of targeting from botnet 
operators are likely the next round of attack. For a discussion of hospital ransomware, see, for 
example, Erin Dietsche, 12 Healthcare Ransomware Attacks of 2016, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & 
CIO REVIEW (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information 
-technology/12-healthcare-ransomware-attacks-of-2016.html. 
 554.  See, e.g., Tax Credits, Rebates, & Savings, ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/ 
savings (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 555.  See also Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incentive-
Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 416 (2016) (“The government could provide companies 
with a tax credit for investments in qualified cybersecurity expenditures up to a certain 
annual  amount.”). 
 556.  See, e.g., Contests, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/ 
contests (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 557.  See, e.g., The World’s First All-Machine Hacking Tournament, CYBER GRAND 
_CHALLENGE (Aug. 4, 2016), http://archive.darpa.mil/cybergrandchallenge/. 
 558.  America Competes Act, H.R. 1806, 110th Cong. (2007) (renewed in substantial part 
by the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-329, 130 Stat. 
2969  (2017)). 
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expanded and used by other agencies to stimulate security 
entrepreneurship and creation of new security tools for both the public 
and private sector.  
c. Proposal 5: Defending market integrity. Defense primacy also 
involves facilitating market mechanisms. Specifically, invigorated 
federal agency enforcement is needed to ensure accuracy in corporate 
advertising and disclosures about security. Because different agencies 
have different missions and enforcement capabilities, a series of 
bilateral interagency enforcement-focused taskforces should be 
created to coordinate security enforcement. These various task forces 
should include teams across DHS, FTC, SEC, DOJ, FDA, CFPB, 
FCC, and any other agencies interested in participating in coordinated 
security enforcement or case referrals. Enforcement actions involving 
private sector security deficits would be either joint or coordinated, 
with each agency in the pair claiming portions of the enforcement 
activity best suited to its mission and authority but sharing resources 
where possible regarding basic investigation. The various task forces’ 
dockets should include enforcement actions against entities who fail 
to fix known security flaws, provide inadequate security advisories, 
violate open source licenses’ security terms, or make false claims of 
security about their products or operations. In this way, each agency 
will work on sections of the puzzle of security while maintaining a 
better sense of the bigger picture of security across both the 
government and the private sector.  
V. CONCLUSION: NO CYBERS WERE HURT IN THE WRITING OF 
THIS ARTICLE559 
Clara: Why would a computer need to protect itself from the 
people who made it? 
The Doctor: All computers do that in the end. You wait ‘til 
the internet starts. Oh, that was a war!560 
While Gadgetopia’s fate ended unhappily, the future of the United 
States need not mirror it. We begin to chart a path away from 
Gadgetopia’s fate by acknowledging that both the public and private 
sector face similar operational security challenges, despite legal 
 
 559.  No Animals Were Hurt in The Making of This Comic, CHEEZBURGER, http:// 
cheezburger.com/8142448128 (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
 560. Dr. Who: Hell Bent (BBC One television broadcast Dec. 5, 2005). 
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differences in structure. This Article has introduced a reciprocal 
security paradigm. This novel paradigm has reframed the traditional 
security discourse away from its current focus on reactive information 
sharing and deterrence. Instead, it redirects attention toward a sector-
neutral security approach with proactive security vigilance infra-
structures and defense primacy.  
May we live long and cyber.561  
  
 
 561.  Live Long and Prosper (Vulcan Salute), FANLORE, https://fanlore.org/wiki
/Live_Long_and_Prosper_(Vulcan_salute) (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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